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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Trump administration has undertaken a sweeping portfolio of actions aimed at
weakening federal climate protections and promoting the development and use of fossil fuels,
primarily in support of President Trump’s “energy dominance” agenda, and consistent with his
views that humans are not causing serious climate change and that environmental regulations
confer many costs and few benefits. Acting pursuant to the President’s orders, federal agencies
have initiated the process of reviewing and potentially revising or rescinding all of the major
regulations enacted by the Obama administration to curtail greenhouse gas emissions from
stationary and mobile sources. The administration has also sought to withdraw the U.S. from the
Paris Agreement, expand and expedite fossil fuel development on federal lands and waters, delay
and withdraw energy efficiency standards, and bail out the failing coal industry.
From the outside, it appears that the administration is flexing its powers to implement
President Trump’s agenda. But the power of the executive branch is not absolute, and the
administration can only go so far before courts, legislators, or other factors outside of its control
prevent it from achieving its goals. In fact, the administration has achieved far less progress in
implementing its deregulatory agenda than many assume.
This paper takes a critical look at what the Trump administration has actually
accomplished in terms of repealing and modifying greenhouse gas emission standards and
otherwise advancing its pro-fossil fuel agenda. As detailed herein and summarized in Figures 1
and 2, the scope of the efforts taken pursuant to this agenda is extremely broad – there are dozens
of different deregulatory actions underway at various agencies, most notably the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). But in most cases, the pace of these efforts has been quite slow. This is
particularly true for efforts to repeal or revise major regulations like the Clean Power Plan and
the motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission and fuel economy standards, as the administration
must adhere to notice-and-comment procedures and must also justify any changes to these rules
in light of the statutory provisions it is implementing.
The administration has been able to quickly rescind and replace internal policy documents
that are not subject to the same procedural requirements as formal regulations, but the practical
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effect of these internal policy changes remains unclear. In many instances, President Trump’s
policies are directly at odds with statutory mandates and therefore unlikely to have a significant
or enduring effect on agency practices. The many deregulatory processes that have been initiated
are also consuming a large amount of federal government resources and creating significant
uncertainty for regulated industries – consequences which are direct conflict with the President’s
stated goals of reducing regulatory inefficiencies and supporting regulated industries such as the
power sector.
Ultimately, the Trump administration will face many barriers in actually effectuating its
goals of lifting regulatory burdens and achieving “energy dominance” through greater reliance
on fossil fuels. Courts have already shot down many of the administration’s initial efforts to
undermine existing regulations, and there is a reasonable chance that some of the final rules to
repeal or replace those regulations will also be vacated by the courts. Even if the administration
is successful in repealing critical climate regulations, the real-world effect of these repeals may be
limited by external legal, social, and economic drivers. A future administration could also reverse
course and reinstate regulation.
Meanwhile, many state and local governments and private actors are moving forward
with their own actions to address climate change. This situation is deeply problematic for
regulated entities that need policy coherence and predictability. Companies typically prefer
uniform federal standards to the complicated and conflicting state and local laws that are
emerging in the absence of clear federal regulations.
The deregulatory strategies deployed by President Trump and federal agencies can be
summarized as follows:
White House: President Trump has rescinded almost all of the executive orders and
policy documents issued by the Obama administration to provide guidance to federal agencies
on climate change mitigation, energy efficiency, and sustainability. President Trump has also
issued executive orders aimed at supporting fossil fuel development or use (without serious
efforts to find ways to use them relatively cleanly, such as through carbon capture, use and
sequestration). This effort has included orders directing agencies to take swift action to review
and repeal or replace any regulations, guidance documents, and internal policies that could

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

ii

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

burden the development or use of domestically-produced fossil fuels. This effectively
encompasses all actions taken to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, otherwise
control the externalities of fossil fuels, and reduce energy consumption. As part of his broader
deregulation agenda, President Trump has also issued several orders that are aimed at
encouraging regulatory repeals and preventing the issuance of new regulations.
Environmental Protection Agency: EPA has initiated notice-and-comment rulemakings
to review and revise or rescind the regulations issued by the Obama administration to control
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary and mobile sources. This is a lengthy multi-year
process, as the agency must issue a proposal to replace or repeal the original rule, accept public
comment on that proposal, consider the comments, and then issue a final rule. EPA is moving
most vigorously with its plans to repeal and replace the Clean Power Plan (establishing emission
standards for existing power plants), the greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty
vehicles, and the methane emission standards for new sources in the oil and gas sector; it has
already issued proposals to repeal or significantly revise each of these rules. Once EPA issues
final rules to repeal or replace these standards, they will almost certainly be challenged in court
and subjected to judicial scrutiny to determine whether they comport with the requirements of
the Clean Air Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other statutes. In the meantime, EPA
has sought to delay the effective date of certain rules during its review process, but courts have
struck down most of these attempts. As a result, many of the rules that are under review remain
in place today.
EPA has also acted to roll back other rules aimed at controlling the externalities of fossil
fuel-fired combustion, either through notice-and-comment proceedings to modify those rules, or
by simply failing to implement and enforce those rules. The enforcement failures have already
been challenged in court, and any formal modifications to the rules will likely be the subject of
litigation as well.
Department of Interior (DOI): DOI has taken several actions to remove barriers to fossil
fuel development, including: the issuance of a final rule repealing key provisions of the Methane
Waste Prevention Rule (which established methane emission standards for oil and gas sources
on federal lands); terminating the moratorium on and programmatic review of the federal coal
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leasing program; revising its operating procedures to streamline fossil fuel permitting; curtailing
environmental reviews of fossil fuel-related proposals; and removing protections for endangered
species. DOI has also expanded the public lands and waters available for fossil fuel development,
in part by working with the President to remove protections for national monuments. Multiple
lawsuits have been filed challenging these actions as well.
Department of Energy (DOE): DOE has delayed and withdrawn energy efficiency
standards that were in development or finalized at the end of the Obama administration. Some
of these delays were successfully challenged in court and DOE was compelled to finalize and
enforce the standards. DOE has also sought to use its authority as an energy regulator to subsidize
the failing coal industry but has run up against opposition from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and would likely be sued if it adopts any final action to this effect. Finally,
DOE and FERC have made efforts to expedite approvals of applications for natural gas
transportation infrastructure and to curtail the scope of environmental reviews for those
applications.
State Department: The State Department has implemented President Trump’s orders to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement. However, due to the rules for withdrawing from that
agreement, the State Department has only been able to issue notification of U.S. intent to
withdraw when eligible to do so late in 2020, an action that a subsequent president could reverse
at any time. The U.S. remains a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and the administration has made no effort to withdraw from that agreement.

Figure ES-1 (next page) summarizes the status of deregulatory efforts with respect to
formal regulations issued by the Obama administration and now under review by the Trump
administration. Figure ES-2 (page vi) lists the legal challenges which have been filed in response
to the deregulatory actions summarized in Figure ES-1.

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

iv

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

Figure ES-1: Status of Deregulatory Efforts
PROGRES S TOWARDS REPEAL & REPLACEMENT

RULE
Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule

S TATUS (ORIGINAL RULE)

Failure to enforce; no official review initiated.

Vehicle Standards Penalties

In effect

X

In effect

HFC Product Standards

Partially vacated
(D.C. Cir. 8-8-17)

M ethane Standards for
M unicipal Landfills

In effect

Energy Efficiency
Standards

X

In effect

M ercury and Air
Toxics Standard

In effect

Heavy-duty Vehicle
Standards (gliders)

X/†

In effect

CO 2 NSPS for Power
Plants

In effect

Clean Power Plan

Stayed
(S.Ct. 2-9-16)

Light-duty Vehicle
Standards

In effect

M ethane NSPS for Oil
and Gas Sources

X

In effect with minor
amendments

M ethane Waste
Prevention Rule

X

Amended
(9-28-18)
Amended
(7-30-18)

Coal Ash Rule

Coal, Oil and Gas
Valuation Rule

action vacated or stayed by court

†

Amendment /
replacement finalized

Repeal finalized

Amendment /
replacement proposed

Repeal proposed

N+C stay finalized

N+C* Stay proposed

Immediate stay

Public comment solicited

Review initiated
most or entire rule affected
X

Repealed (8-7-17); repeal
vacated (N.D. Cal. 3-29-19)

X

minor aspects of rule affected

no action

action vacated or stayed by court

* N+C = notice and comment
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Figure ES-2: Lawsuits Challenging Deregulatory Actions
RULE

RELATED CAS ES *

CAS E S TATUS

Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule

Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (3d. Cir. Mar. 23, 2017): Challenging
EPA failure to respond to state petition seeking enforcement of rule.

Dismissed (8-31-18).

Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2017): Same.

Open.

Connecticut v. Pruitt, No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. May 16, 2017):
Same.

Court ordered EPA to
respond (2-7-18); EPA
denied petition (4-13-18).

Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. S ept. 27, 2017): Same.

Court ordered EPA to
respond (6-13-18); EPA
denied petition (10-5-18).

New York et al. v. EPA, No. 18-406 (S .D.N.Y. Jan 17, 2018): Same.

Court ordered EPA to
respond (6-12-18).

New York et al. v. EPA, No. 19-1019 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019):
Challenging EPA determination on adequacy of existing CSAPR rule.

Open.

Vehicle Standards Penalties

NRDC v. NHTS A, No. 17-280 (2d Cir. S ept. 7, 2017): Challenging
NHTSA's delay of rule establishing penalties for non-compliance with
vehicle emission standards.

Court vacated rule which
delayed effective date of
penalties (4-23-18).

HFC Product Standards

NRDC v. Wheeler, No. 18-1172 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018): Challenging
EPA decision to suspend enforcement of HFC rule.

Open.

New York v. Wheeler, No. 18-1174 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018): Same.

Open.

M ethane Standards for
M unicipal Landfills

NRDC v. Pruitt, No. 17-1157 (D.C. Cir 2017): Challenging EPA's
administrative stay of performance standards and emission guidelines for
municipal solid waste landfills.

Petitioners agreed to
voluntary dismissal after
stay expired (2-1-18).

Energy Efficiency
Standards

New York et al. v. Perry, No. 17-918 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2017):
Challenging DOE decision to delay energy efficiency standards for ceiling
fans.

Resolved when DOE issued
standards (5-24-17)

NRDC v. Perry, No. 4:17-cv-03404 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2017):
Challenging DOE failure to issue final efficiency standards for air
compressors, walk-in coolers/freezers, uninterruptable power supplies,
portable A/C units, and commercial packaged boilers.

Court held DOE failure
violated EPCA (2-15-18).

NRDC v. DOE, No. 1:170-cv-06989 (S .D.N.Y. S ept. 14, 2017):
Challenging temporary suspension of efficiency test procedures for air
conditioners and heat pumps.

Court held suspension was
unlawful (2-22-19).

M ercury and Air
Toxics Standard

N/A (no final action)

* Does not include legal challenges to rules issued by Obama administration.
Continued on next page…
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Figure ES-2: Lawsuits Challenging Deregulatory Actions (continued)
RULE

RELATED CAS ES *

CAS E S TATUS

Heavy-duty Vehicle
Standards (gliders)

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 18-1190 (D.C. Cir. July 17,
2018): Challenging EPA's "no action assurance" re: enforcement of heavyduty vehicle GHG emission / fuel economy standards for small
manufacturers of glider kits and vehicles.

Court stayed "no action
assurance" (7-18-18) and
EPA revoked it (7-26-18).

CO2 NSPS for Power
Plants

N/A (no final action)

Clean Power Plan

N/A (no final action)

Light-duty Vehicle
Standards

California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2018): Challenging
EPA's revocation and re-issuance of its final determination re: the
appropriateness of light-duty vehicle emission standards M Y 2022-2025.

Open.

M ethane NSPS for Oil
and Gas Sources

Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2017):
Challenging EPA's administrative stay of methane NSPS.

Court vacated administrative
stay (7-3-17).

M ethane Waste
Prevention Rule

California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-03804 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2017):
Challenging BLM 's administrative stay of the methane waste prevention
rule.

Court vacated administrative
stay (10-4-17).

California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-07186 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017):
Challenging BLM 's "suspension rule" which delayed the effective date of
methane waste prevention rule for 1 year.

Court issued preliminary
injunction of rule (2-22-18);
BLM appealed (4-32-18).

California v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. S ept. 18, 2018):
Challenging final amendments to rule.

Open.

S ierra Club v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05984 (N.D. Cal. S ept. 28, 2018):
Same.

Open.

Coal Ash Rule

N/A

Coal, Oil and Gas
Valuation Rule

California et al v. DOI et al, No. C17-5948 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2017):
Challenging repeal of rule as arbitrary and capricious under APA.

Court vacated repeal (3-2919).

* Does not include legal challenges to rules issued by Obama administration.
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I. Introduction
During his campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump made it clear that he believed
climate change was a “hoax” and intended to use the power of the Executive Branch to dismantle
the regulatory architecture established by the Obama administration to address climate change.
The president argued that lifting unnecessary regulatory burdens, reviving the U.S. coal industry,
and achieving American energy dominance would stimulate economic growth and create jobs
for American workers. Since then, his administration has made considerable efforts to repeal or
modify a wide array of regulations, policies, and guidance aimed at curtailing greenhouse gas
emissions and otherwise controlling the use and externalities of fossil fuels. The Trump
administration has also supplemented its deregulatory efforts with new policies and proposals
aimed at further promoting and subsidizing the development and use of fossil fuels.
The administration has been able to pursue such a sweeping deregulatory agenda, at least
in part, because the regulatory framework to address climate change was put into place through
executive action rather than congressional action. But the administration’s authority to modify
this framework is nonetheless constrained by statutory mandates and other factors outside of its
control. These constraints include the substantive mandates of statutes such as the Clean Air Act
(which provided the original basis for many of the policies that President Trump now seeks to
unravel) as well as procedural requirements that agencies must adhere to when modifying or
repealing existing regulations.1 Due to these constraints, the process of deregulation has been a
slow one, and will likely continue to move at a slow pace for the remainder of the Trump
presidency. Once rules and other actions are finalized, they will be subject to judicial review and
may be annulled by the courts.2
For an in-depth overview of procedural requirements governing regulatory rollbacks, see Bethany A. Davis Noll &
Denise A. Grab, Deregulation: Process and Procedures That Govern Agency Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks, 38
ENERGY L.J. 269 (2017).
2 As detailed herein, many lawsuits have already been filed challenging the administration’s failure to implement and
enforce existing rules, and several decisions have been issued holding that agencies abrogated their duties in this
context. Lawsuits have also been filed challenging new policies issued by the Trump administration, but these
lawsuits have been less successful due to the lack of a “final agency action” to challenge. More legal challenges will
come once the administration does issue final actions with respect to specific regulations like the Clean Power Plan.
For a more detailed discussion of litigation during the first year of the Trump administration, see Dena P. Adler, U.S.
Climate Change Litigation in the Age of Trump: Year One (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 2018).
1
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Even if President Trump’s rollbacks are upheld in court, they could be reversed by a
future president or Congress. In the meantime, his deregulatory agenda is prompting a
proliferation of state and local actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including
legal actions aimed at curbing fossil fuel development. This is leading to a patchwork of state
policies that is less than optimal for the goal of protecting the climate and that is potentially
burdensome for many American companies. In sum, the administration is expending an
enormous amount of resources on a deregulatory agenda that may accomplish very little other
than delaying action on climate change and creating a huge amount of regulatory uncertainty for
regulated entities. This is not a “small government” approach, nor does it serve the long-term
interests of industries that need to start preparing for a transition to a low-carbon economic
future.
This paper assesses what the Trump administration has actually accomplished in terms
of rolling back or amending emission standards, other regulations, and climate policies, taking
into account administrative hurdles as well as judicial challenges faced by agencies.3 Part II
describes some of the overarching policies issued by President Trump and the White House to
guide deregulatory efforts. Part III describes the actions undertaken by EPA to roll back rules
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and otherwise addressing externalities associated
with fossil fuel use. Part IV describes the actions undertaken by the Department of Interior to
remove barriers to fossil fuel development on public lands and waters. Part V describes the
Department of Energy’s efforts to delay energy efficiency standards and support fossil fuel-fired
utilities. Part VI describes the State Department’s role in the President’s intended withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement. Part VII concludes that the current situation is untenable for both
regulated entities and the American public and that a cohesive federal policy, preferably enacted
by Congress, would better serve all interests.4

This paper focuses on policies and regulations that deal with climate change mitigation – i.e., the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. It does not address the policies and regulations that deal with climate change adaptation.
4 The Climate Leadership Council and others have advocated for congressional legislation to create a carbon tax and
dividend program based on studies suggesting that this would have a greater emissions impact and be more efficient
than the current framework of regulations. See David Bailey & Greg Bertelsen, A Winning Trade: How Replacing the
Obama-Era Climate Regulations With a Carbon Dividends Program Starting at $40/Ton Would Yield Far Greater Emission
Reductions (Climate Leadership Council 2018). See also Justin Gundlach, To Negotiate a Carbon Tax: A Rough Map of
Interactions, Tradeoffs, and Risks, 43(S) COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 269 (2018).
3
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II. Executive Policy Framework under the Trump Administration
In the late-2000s, there was a strong push for federal action on climate change. More than
a decade had passed since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) had entered into force, the nations of the world had recognized that climate change
was one of the most pressing environmental problems of our time, and yet greenhouse gas
emissions and fossil fuel use were still on the rise. Congress failed to enact a legislative solution
to the problem, and so the Obama administration used its authority to enact a broad suite of
policies and regulations to curtail greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel use. While some of
President Obama’s policies were issued solely on the basis of his executive authority, the most
significant actions – specifically, greenhouse gas emission standards for power plants, motor
vehicles, and other source categories – were promulgated under the authority of the Clean Air
Act and other federal statutes. These regulations are thus tethered to legal requirements that
cannot be modified or repealed by executive fiat.
Upon taking office, President Trump made it clear that he intended to reverse course and
dismantle the regulatory architecture that his predecessor had put in place, consistent with his
campaign promises. He published his “America First Energy Plan” in which he promised to
exploit the country’s “vast untapped domestic energy reserves” and remove “burdensome
regulations” including “harmful and unnecessary policies such as the Clean Power Plan.”5 He
also promised to “reviv[e] America’s coal industry” and otherwise support and promote
domestic fossil fuel development and use.6
President Trump then issued a series of executive orders aimed at solidifying his
deregulatory agenda. First came two overarching orders on deregulation: Executive Order 13771,
“Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” instructed agencies to identify two
existing regulations to be repealed for every one regulation that is proposed and to ensure that
the incremental costs of new regulations finalized in the year are no greater than zero.7 Executive

Exec. Office of the President, An America First Energy Plan (2017), available at https://perma.cc/Z7UG-UGCC.
Id.
7 Exec. Order No. 13771 of January 30, 2017: Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb.
3, 2017).
5
6
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Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” directed agencies to designate
Regulatory Reform Officers and establish Regulatory Reform Task Forces to evaluate and identify
regulations for repeal.8 The legality of these orders is dubious, as they direct agencies to consider
impermissible factors (i.e., factors not specified in statutes) when making regulatory decisions.9
Plaintiffs have not yet been able to establish a concrete “injury” which would give rise to standing
to bring a lawsuit challenging the executive orders, but that situation could change as agencies
take concrete action to implement these directives.10
These broad deregulatory orders were followed by more specific orders pertaining to
climate change and energy. Executive Order 13783, “Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth,” laid the foundation for the administration’s attack on climate change
regulations. It directed agencies to review all actions that potentially “burden the development
or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas,
coal and nuclear energy resources,” and to rescind or revise any actions which do burden the
development or use of those resources.11 It explicitly called for the review of all major greenhouse
gas emissions standards, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Clean Power
Plan (which established carbon pollution guidelines for existing power plants), EPA’s carbon
pollution standards for new power plants, EPA’s methane emission standards for oil and gas
sources, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)’s methane waste rule.
In addition, the order directly repealed certain presidential and regulatory actions
pertaining to energy and climate, including President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which was
established with the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, preparing the U.S. for the

Exec. Order No. 13777 of February 24, 2017: Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Mar. 1,
2017).
9 See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Trump’s Executive Order on Regulatory Costs is Not Only Arbitrary; It is Also
Against the Law, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017).
10 See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the legality of the executive orders when they were first issued, but acknowledging that plaintiffs may be
able to establish standing in the future).
11 Exec. Order No. 13783 of March 28, 2017: Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg.
16093 (Mar. 31, 2017). This order broadly defined “burden” as “unnecessarily obstruct, delay, curtail, or otherwise
impose significant costs on the siting, permitting, production, utilization, transmission, or delivery of energy
resources.” Id. at §2(b).
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impacts of climate change, and leading international efforts to address climate change;12 various
memoranda and reports that were issued by President Obama to further flesh out the actions his
administration would take to address climate change;13 and the technical guidance establishing
the social cost of carbon (SC-CO2), methane (SC-CH4), and nitrous oxide (SC-N2O) metrics to be
used by federal agencies in regulatory actions.14 Notably, the order did not expressly prohibit
agencies from using the SC-CO2, SC-CH4, and SC-N2O metrics – rather, it called for a review of
those metrics and instructed agencies to “ensure… that any estimates [of the social cost of
greenhouse gas emissions] are consistent with guidance contained in OMB Circular A-4” in the
meantime.15
President Trump’s order also contained directives to specific agencies to rescind guidance,
policies, and other decisions pertaining to climate change. In particular, it directed the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to rescind its “Final Guidance for Federal Departments and
Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in
National Environmental Policy Act Reviews,”16 and it directed the Department of Interior (DOI)
to terminate its programmatic environmental review of the federal coal leasing program as well
as its moratorium on the issuance of new coal leases.17 Finally, the order directed all agencies to
identify any additional actions related to or arising from the rescinded policies, memoranda, and

Exec. Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan (June 2013), available at https://perma.cc/7U9P7GVE.
13 The revoked memoranda and reports included: Presidential Memorandum of June 25, 2013: Power Sector Carbon
Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39535 (July 1, 2013); Presidential Memorandum of November 3, 2015: Mitigating
Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 68747
(Nov. 6, 2015), Presidential Memorandum of September 21, 2016: Climate Change and National Security; Exec. Office
of the President, Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions (March 2014).
14 Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Technical
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (May 2013,
Revised August 2016); Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Addendum to Technical
Support Document on Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866:
Application of the Methodology to Estimate the Social Cost of Methane and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (Aug.
2016).
15 Exec. Order No. 13783, supra note 11, § 5.
16 CEQ, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of
Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews (Aug. 1, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/F7BR-E6WX.
See also CEQ, Notice of Final Guidance, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 (Aug. 5, 2016).
17 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3338: Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the
Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/JVT4-J7VR.
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orders issued by President Obama and to suspend, rescind, or revise those actions as soon as
practicable.
Since then, President Trump has issued additional orders further elaborating on his
energy policy agenda. Executive Order 13795, “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy
Strategy,” called upon DOI to establish procedures for expanding and streamlining offshore oil
and gas development.18 Executive Order 13807, “Establishing Discipline and Accountability in
the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects,” contained
directives aimed at expediting the federal approval of major infrastructure projects (defined to
include energy production and generation, electricity transmission, and pipeline projects).19
Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” established general goals on energy, water
and resource efficiency, while simultaneously revoking an Obama-era order that required
agencies to set specific energy efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction goals.20 Most recently,
Executive Order 13868, “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth”, and Executive
Order 13867, “The Issuance of Permits with Respect to Facilities and Land Transportation
Crossings at the International Boundaries of the United States”, both contained provisions aimed
at removing barriers to and expediting federal approvals for energy infrastructure, particularly
oil and gas pipelines.21
The administration is also moving forward with efforts to change and potentially curtail
the analysis of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change-related considerations in
environmental reviews conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In 2018,
CEQ issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) in which it announced that it
was considering updating the implementing regulations for NEPA to “ensure a more efficient,

Exec. Order No. 13795 of April 28, 2017, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815
(May 3, 2018).
19 Exec. Order No. 13807 of August 15, 2017: Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental review
and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, 82 Fed. Reg. 40463 (Aug. 24, 2017).
20 Exec. Order No. 13834 of May 17, 2018: Efficient Federal Operations, 83 Fed. Reg. 23771 (May 22, 2018) (revoking
Exec. Order No. 13693 of March 19, 2015: Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade).
21 Exec. Order No. 13868 of April 10, 2019: Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth (Apr. 10, 2019);
Exec. Order No. 13867 of April 10, 2019: The Issuance of Permits with Respect to Facilities and Land Transportation
Crossings at the International Boundaries of the United States (Apr. 10, 2019).
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timely, and effective” review process.22 CEQ has also been quietly working on revised guidance
on the consideration of greenhouse gas emissions in NEPA documentations – it submitted a draft
of the guidance to OIRA on February 6, 2019,23 but it has not yet solicited any public input on the
draft or published any information about the scope and content of the guidance.
While some of the policy changes introduced by President Trump did take immediate
effect, the directives with the most significant consequences – specifically, those to review and
repeal or replace major climate regulations – can only be implemented by agencies in accordance
with the notice-and-comment procedures established by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and the substantive statutory mandates under which these regulations were initially
promulgated. These laws provide an important constraint on the administration’s ability to move
forward with its deregulatory agenda.
Moreover, to the extent that the administration has enacted immediate changes in policy,
these changes have not necessarily had the intended effect. The rescission of CEQ guidance on
climate change and environmental reviews is a good example: that guidance did not impose any
new requirements on agencies, it simply reflected pre-existing legal obligations outlined in
NEPA, as fleshed out by the implementing regulations and judicial decisions. As such, the
rescission of this guidance had no legal effect on the scope of agency obligations under NEPA
and only a limited practical effect on how agencies conduct NEPA analysis.24

However, the

rescission does add to uncertainty over how to treat greenhouse gas emissions in the NEPA
process.
The administration has also sought to scale back or wholly eliminate federal funding for
programs involving climate change science, mitigation, and adaptation, with only limited
success. For example, President Trump’s budget request for FY2018 proposed major cuts to EPA’s

CEQ, ANPR: Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 28591 (June 20, 2018).
23 OIRA, Pending EO 12866 Regulatory Review: RIN: 0331-ZA03, EO 12866 Meetings,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=128676 (last visited May 16, 2019).
24 As discussed in Part IV, some agencies have attempted to curtail their analysis of greenhouse gas emissions in
NEPA reviews so as to avoid reaching a determination that those emissions are a “significant impact” under NEPA.
Nonetheless, agency reviews still comport with almost all of the recommendations contained in the guidance (e.g.,
agencies are accounting for direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions as well as the impacts of climate change on
proposals undergoing NEPA review). And the rescission of the guidance appears to have had no effect on how
courts interpret agency obligations under NEPA.
22

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

7

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

Clean Air and Climate programs, the earth science programs managed by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and the clean energy research programs managed by the Department of
Energy (DOE). Congress rejected most of these proposed cuts in the FY2018 spending package
and actually increased funding for the DOE clean energy research programs.25 The administration
has been more successful with its efforts to scale back international climate finance, as Congress
did adopt the President’s FY2018 proposal to eliminate funding to the UNFCCC, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). 26
However, Congress rejected proposed cuts to other sources of international climate finance and
allocated nearly $140 million in FY2018 to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which is one
of financial mechanisms for the UNFCCC.27
For these reasons, there is considerably less than meets the eye with respect to the
administration’s progress towards rolling back the existing portfolio of rules and policies
developed agencies to address climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Below, we
describe the status of specific deregulatory efforts, focusing first on efforts at EPA and then
turning to other agencies.

III. Environmental Protection Agency
A. Cross-cutting Policies and Proposals
Under Scott Pruitt and (since his departure) Andrew Wheeler, EPA has played a pivotal
role in implementing Trump’s deregulatory agenda. In addition to initiating the review of all
major greenhouse gas emission standards (discussed below), EPA has also introduced several
overarching policies and proposals that have cross-cutting implications for future regulatory
processes, including actions to revoke, amend, or reinstate emission standards.

For a more detailed comparison of President Trump’s proposed budget cuts and final budget decisions in the
FY2018 omnibus spending package, see Rob Cowin, How Did Climate and Clean Energy Programs Fare in the 108 Federal
Budget? UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/6EAP-MHBK.
26 For an overview of cuts to international climate finance, see Joe Thwaites, US 2018 Budget and Climate Finance: It’s
Bad, but Not As Bad As You Might Think, WRI BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/RYX8-2SC2.
27 Id.
25
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Shortly after Pruitt was appointed EPA Administrator, he announced what he called a
“back-to-basics” agenda, a central tenet of which was “creating sensible regulations that enhance
economic growth.”28 The agenda was announced at a press conference with coal miners, where
Pruitt expressed strong support for revitalizing the coal industry after it “was nearly devasted by
years of regulatory overreach.”29 Pruitt cited the review of the Clean Power Plan as a prime
example of how this agenda would benefit the coal industry.30 This set the tone for EPA’s
subsequent review of greenhouse gas emission standards and other rules affecting the fossil fuel
industry. While Pruitt has since stepped down as EPA administrator, his acting successor
Andrew Wheeler is continuing with the same course of action pursuant to the President’s orders.
EPA has also undertaken two cross-cutting regulatory initiatives with important
implications for climate-related rulemakings. The first was a proposal to restrict the use of
scientific evidence in rulemaking. The proposed rule, misleadingly labeled “Strengthening
Transparency in Regulatory Science,” would bar EPA from using scientific studies in the
development of significant new regulations unless the underlying data “are publicly available in
a manner sufficient for independent validation.”31 The chief concern with this proposal is that it
will block the use of much valid, peer-reviewed, and highly relevant research on pollution and
public health effects, because many studies depend on data that cannot legally be made public.
For example, the proposal would prevent EPA from using studies that rely on confidential patient
information, which is a critical element of studies showing the health impacts of pollutants.32
The EPA Science Advisory Board has pushed back against these efforts to restrict science
in rulemaking and has requested an opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule before the
administration proceeds further.33 In the letter requesting review, the Board noted that the rule

Press Release, EPA, EPA Launches Back-To-Basics Agenda at Pennsylvania Coal Mine (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/DSF6-LYUW.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 EPA, Proposed Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18768 (Apr. 30, 2018).
32 For further explanation, see The Medical Society Consortium on Climate & Health, Talking Points on Proposed Rule
“Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science” (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/4WJE-N2XY
33 Science Advisory Board, EPA Office of the Administrator, Letter to EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Science
Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of EPA Proposed Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science
(June 28, 2018), available at: https://perma.cc/RLM5-PMWX.
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could have far reaching consequences and urged EPA to heed public input on this matter. 34 The
Board also published an internal memorandum in which it noted certain concerns about the
proposal, including the fact that it “fails to mention that there are various ways to assess the
validity of the prior epidemiologic studies without public access to data and analytic methods,”
that it “oversimplifies” arguments in favor of the rule, and that it overlooks key reasons for why
data (particularly patient data) may need to be kept confidential.35
The second initiative with important implications for climate-related rulemakings is
EPA’s ANPR soliciting comment on whether and how it should promulgate regulations
“clarifying” its approach to cost-benefit analysis under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and other environmental statutes.36 In the press release accompanying the ANPR, Pruitt stated
that EPA was undertaking this action due to concerns that the “previous administration inflated
the benefits and underestimated the costs of its regulations through questionable cost-benefit
analysis.”37 If EPA proceeds with this proposal, it could have implications for how EPA will
weigh costs and benefits in future rulemakings. EPA has already modified its cost-benefit analysis
for several rules to justify the repeal of those rules and may seek to codify these changes in the
regulation. For example, to support its proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan (discussed
below), EPA adopted a new cost-benefit analysis wherein it: (i) confined its estimates of the social
cost of carbon to “domestic bounds” and increased the discount rate applied to those estimates,
dramatically reducing the projected costs of CO2 emitted in the year 2030 from $50 to $1 per ton,
(ii) downplayed or ignored the air pollution co-benefits of climate regulations, and (iii) inflated
the estimated compliance costs by changing how it accounts for energy savings.38
It remains to be seen how EPA will proceed with these two rulemakings or whether they
will be upheld in court, as there is no clear statutory basis for either of them. In the meantime, as

Id. at 3.
Alison Cullen, Chair, EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) Work Group on EPA Planned Actions for SAB
Consideration of the Underlying Science, Memorandum re: Preparations for Chartered SAB Discussions of Proposed
Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science RIN 2080-AA14 (May 12, 2018), available at
https://perma.cc/9C87-2QJB.
36 EPA, ANPR: Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rulemaking
Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 27524 (June 13, 2018).
37 Press Release, EPA Headquarters, EPA Administrator Pruitt Proposes Cost-Benefit Analysis Reform (June 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/JC38-KLSM.
38 See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean Power Plan: Proposal (Oct. 2017).
34
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discussed below, EPA continues to move forward with efforts to repeal and otherwise undermine
existing protections – including greenhouse gas emission standards for stationary and mobile
sources, product standards for hydrofluorocarbons (a particularly potent class of greenhouse gas
emissions), and other environmental standards aimed at internalizing externalities associated
with fossil fuel use.

B. Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Stationary and Mobile Sources
EPA possesses the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air
Act. This issue was decided by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA – a lawsuit brought by
twelve states and several cities challenging EPA’s failure to act on a petition to regulate
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under section 202 of the Act.39 The critical questions in that
case were: (i) whether plaintiffs had standing to sue, (ii) whether greenhouse gases qualified as
“air pollutants” that EPA was authorized to regulate under the Act, and (iii) whether EPA could
decline to exercise that authority “because regulation would conflict with other administration
priorities.”40 The Supreme Court found that the State of Massachusetts, at least, had standing to
sue. It concluded that greenhouse gases did qualify as “air pollutants” within the meaning of the
Act, and thus EPA had authority to regulate those emissions if it concluded that they endangered
public health and welfare, and EPA could not decline to regulate these emissions based on
political, social, or economic considerations not enumerated in the statutory text. 41 The Supreme
Court reaffirmed EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in American Electric Power
v. Connecticut, where it held that the Clean Air Act grant of authority displaced federal common
law nuisance claims pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions.42
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Clean Air Act is an available tool for
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Granted, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court did not
explicitly hold that greenhouse gases from motor vehicles or any other source category do
endanger public health and welfare (as this issue was remanded to EPA to decide). However, to

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 527.
41 Id. at 530-35.
42 American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
39
40
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establish jurisdiction, the Court had to analyze whether the failure to regulate emissions gave rise
to a sufficiently imminent and concrete injury for the purposes of Article III standing. The Court
concluded that such an injury did exist and cited various facts and concessions to support this
conclusion. For example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that:
The harms associated with climate change and serious and well recognized. Indeed, [a
2001 National Research Council Report] – which EPA regards as an ‘objective and
independent assessment of the relevant science,’ – identifies a number of environmental
changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including ‘the global retreat of
mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of ice on
rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20 th century
relative to the past few thousand years…’.”43

Justice Stevens further noted that EPA (then under the administration of President George W.
Bush) did not dispute the causal connection between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
and global warming, and thus, at a minimum, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions
“contribute[d] to the petitioners’ injuries.”44 The Court dismissed the argument that this
contribution was too insignificant to provide a basis for standing because EPA regulations would
only target a small proportion of overall global emissions. The Court explained that “accepting
this premise would doom most challenges to regulatory actions” because regulations frequently
only deal with a piece of a larger overall problem.45 The Court’s standing analysis put EPA on
notice that the Court understood the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions and it was therefore
highly unlikely that the Court (at least as then constituted) would uphold a subsequent finding
from EPA of no endangerment.
On remand from that case, EPA issued a formal endangerment finding in which it
concluded that six greenhouse gases – CO2, CH4, N2O, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) – threatened public health and welfare.46
In the same action, EPA issued a separate finding that emissions from motor vehicles caused or

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
Id. at 523.
45 Id. at 524. The Court also noted that “reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a tentative step” in light of
the significant quantities of greenhouse gases produced by U.S. motor vehicles each year. Id. at 524-25.
46 EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
43
44
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contributed to the threat to public health and welfare associated with climate change.47 While the
“cause or contributes” finding was specific to motor vehicles, the endangerment finding was
broadly worded such to encompass all sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and EPA was
therefore able to use it as the basis for regulating emissions from multiple source categories. The
endangerment finding was upheld by a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court accepted its validity.48 By the end of the Obama
administration, EPA had promulgated greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor vehicles,
power plants, oil and gas facilities, and municipal landfills.
A regulatory approach was not the Obama administration’s first choice for controlling
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources. The administration proposed to amend the
Clean Air Act to adopt an economy-wide cap-and-trade program – a way to use a market
mechanism to induce greenhouse gas reductions. This program was incorporated into the
American Clean Energy and Security Act, better known as the Waxman-Markey Bill. It passed
the House of Representatives by a vote of 219-212 on June 26, 2009. However, the companion bill
died in the Senate in 2010, and the outcomes of the subsequent Congressional elections made it
clear that no climate legislation could be achieved during President Obama’s time in office. Thus,
lacking the ability to pursue its preferred market-based approach, the administration pivoted to
the use of the command-and-control techniques provided by the existing Clean Air Act. The
statute is not well suited to control of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from existing
sources (such as coal-fired power plants). The Obama EPA did its best to thread the needle in
drafting the Clean Power Plan and other greenhouse gas regulations. However, this approach
attracted serious legal and political opposition, both from affected industries and from a number
of states. As noted below, while legal challenges to the Clean Power Plan were pending before
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in February 2016 took the unprecedented
step of staying implementation of the Clean Power Plan.

Id.
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), and amended sub nom. Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 606 F. App'x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
47
48
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The Trump administration has since initiated the process of reviewing and reconsidering
these rules and has already proposed to repeal or replace certain standards, most notably the
emission standards for existing power plants. However, despite the urgings of some, the
administration has not taken any steps to repeal the 2009 endangerment finding. In the years
since 2009 the scientific evidence supporting the endangerment finding has become considerably
stronger.

1. Clean Power Plan (CO2 Emission Guidelines for Existing Power Plants)
The Clean Power Plan, finalized in 2015, established CO2 emission guidelines for existing
fossil fuel-fired power plants under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.49 This rule, which sought
to control one of the largest emission sources in the country, was heralded as the centerpiece of
the Obama administration’s efforts to address climate change.
Under Section 111(d), EPA may set performance standards for existing sources within a
particular source category.50 The performance standards must reflect “the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emissions reduction [BSER]
taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements.”51 EPA has the authority under this section to
issue “emission guidelines” setting forth the performance level that is achievable applying the
BSER (e.g., expressed as an emissions rate) as well as procedural requirements that states must
follow when implementing section 111(d).52 States would then submit plans for meeting these
standards. EPA can reject state plans and even substitute a federal implementation plan if needed
to control emissions under this provision.53

EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources; Electric Utility Generating Units; Final
Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “Clean Power Plan”).
50 Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
51 Clean Air Act § 111 (a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
52 Franz T. Litz et al., What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry? Using the Clean Air Act to Reduce Emissions, Building
on Existing Regional Programs (World Resources Institute 2011); Christopher E. Van Atten, Structuring Power Plan
Emissions Standards Under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act – Standards for Existing Power Plants (M.J. Bradley &
Associates LLC, 2013).
53 Daniel P. Selmi, Federal Implementation Plans and the Path to Clean Power, 637 GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. REV. 637 (2016).
49

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

14

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

For existing fossil fuel-fired power plants, EPA determined that the BSER consisted of onsite heat rate improvements at power plants as well as fuel switching to natural gas and zeroemitting renewable energy sources. Based on that BSER definition, EPA calculated regional CO2
emission performance rates for coal plants and natural gas power plants and then used this
information to calculate statewide emission reduction targets based on the mix of energy sources
within the state and region. EPA anticipated that the rule would reduce CO2 emissions from
existing power plants 32% below 2005 levels by 2030, resulting in public health and climate
benefits worth an estimated $34 - $54 billion per year by 2030.54
Industry groups and states immediately challenged the final rule in the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, arguing that it exceeded EPA’s authority.55 In February 2016, the Supreme Court put
the rule on hold pending the outcome of that case.56 The judicial stay has remained in effect since
then.
Throughout his campaign, Trump promised to repeal the Clean Power Plan. Just over
two months after the inauguration, on April 4, 2017, EPA announced plans to reconsider the rule,
pursuant to the directives contained in Executive Order 13783.57 That same day, EPA withdrew
proposed rules for a Model Trading Program and Clean Energy Incentive Program that would
have assisted states in implementing the Clean Power Plan.58 EPA also asked the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals to hold the rule litigation in abeyance during its reconsideration process.59 The
court granted that initial request as well as all subsequent abeyance requests, and the litigation
remains on hold.60

EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, EPA-452/R-15-003 (Aug. 2015), available at
https://perma.cc/HE2S-EV3J.
55 West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
56 Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (S. Ct. Feb. 9, 2016).
57 EPA, Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
58 EPA, Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric
Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework
Regulations; and Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16144 (Apr. 3, 2017).
59 Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming Rulemaking, And Motion to Hold
Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/32LQPVRG.
60 Order Granting Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/HC7Y-SS29; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
8, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/B2R6-SVSC; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 151363 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 9, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/BL8X-6VKJ; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West
54
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On October 16, 2017, EPA published a proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan,
accompanied by a revised regulatory impact analysis (RIA) aimed at justifying the repeal.61 EPA
had originally estimated that the Clean Power Plan would generate $25 to $45 billion in net
benefits per year by 2030, but in the new RIA, EPA concluded that the repeal of the plan could
generate anywhere from $28.3 billion in net costs to $14 billion in net benefits by 2030.62
Commentators have criticized EPA for manipulating its cost-benefit analysis to achieve these new
results.63
On December 28, 2017, EPA issued an ANPR to replace the Clean Power Plan in which it
solicited comment on what should be included in a new potential rule to regulate CO 2 from
existing power plants under Section 111(d).64 In August 2018, EPA published a proposed
replacement rule for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants, which it
labeled the “Affordable Clean Energy” (ACE) rule.65
The proposed rule would require far fewer emission reductions. EPA is proposing to
define the BSER as heat rate efficiency improvements that can be implemented on-site at existing
power plants. This means that the performance standards issued pursuant to the rule would only
reflect the emission reductions that can be achieved through on-site energy efficiency measures,
and would not reflect the much greater emission reductions that could be achieved by replacing
emission-intensive power sources with cleaner sources of power or actions aimed at improving
end-use energy efficiency. It is possible that the administration’s proposed approach will fail to

Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/6MBB-LBG2; Order Issuing
Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/KG22KTSQ.
61 EPA, Proposed Rule: Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (Oct. 16, 2017); EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean
Power Plan: Proposal (Oct. 2017).
62 For a discussion of how EPA altered its approach to cost-benefit analysis, see Kate Shouse, EPA’s Proposal to Repeal
the Clean Power Plan: Benefits and Costs, CRS Report No. 45119 (Feb. 28, 2018).
63 See, e.g., Alan J. Krupnick & Amelia Keyes, Hazy Treatment of Health Benefits: The Case of the Clean Power Plan,
Resources for the Future Blog (Oct. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/67AM-JDBR; Kevin Steinberger & Starla Yeh, Pruitt
Cooks the Books to Hide Clean Power Plan Benefits (Oct. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/5QAP-LH6S..
64 EPA, ANPR: State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 82
Fed. Reg. 61507 (Dec. 28, 2017).
65 EPA, Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions
to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746
(Aug. 31, 2018).
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ensure any emissions reductions at all insofar as there may be a “rebound effect” wherein plants
that implement heat-rate improvements may be called upon to run more hours, thus increasing
the total amount of CO2 generated (even if the rate of CO2 emissions decreases).
The proposed rule also differs from the Clean Power Plan insofar as it does not contain
any numerical targets for states, but rather leaves it up to states to establish their own
performance standards based on the BSER definition. EPA is also proposing to let states set
weaker standards based on their assessment of the plant’s “remaining useful life”. Many
environmentalists are concerned that the rule essentially allows states to decide how much to cut
emissions, if at all, rather than establishing enforceable quantitative targets.
EPA prepared another RIA for the proposed ACE rule in which it found that replacing
the Clean Power Plan with the proposed rule would result in billions of dollars of net “foregone
benefits” (i.e., costs) under every scenario it analyzed.66 Notably, EPA reached this conclusion
even after applying its new methodology for calculating costs and benefits in climate-related
rulemakings.
As noted above, the original Clean Power Plan is not currently in effect due to the
Supreme Court stay. But many of the objectives of the plan are nonetheless being met, as coal use
in the U.S. continues to decline, and coal plants are being retired each year due to legal, social,
and economic factors beyond the administration’s control.67 This trend will likely continue
regardless of whether the administration is successful in replacing the Clean Power Plan.

2. CO2 Emission Standards for New Power Plants
On the same day that EPA issued the Clean Power Plan, the agency also promulgated CO2
emission standards for new and modified fossil fuel-fired power plants.68 Section 111 of the Clean
Air Act requires EPA to issue performance standards for both new and existing sources within

EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review
Program, EPA-452/R-18-006 (Aug. 2018).
67 See Reid Wilson, Coal Industry Mired in Decline Despite Trump Pledges, THE HILL (Mar. 4, 2018),
https://perma.cc/AY2P-MX2S; EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook: Coal (July 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/9SYV-69E6.
68 EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510 (Oct. 23, 2015).
66
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the same source category (and the term “new source” is defined to include modified facilities).69
The language defining the basis for new source performance standards (NSPS) is the same as for
existing sources – the standards must reflect application of the BSER, taking into account costs
and non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.70 However, for
new sources, EPA promulgates these standards directly rather than issuing emission guidelines
for states to implement. And of course, the BSER may differ for new and modified sources as
compared with existing sources.
EPA determined that the BSER for CO2 emissions from new coal-fired power plants
should include the installation of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) equipment that would
capture approximately 16-23% of the CO2 emissions generated (depending on the type of coal)
and set the corresponding NSPS for new coal-fired power plants at 1,400 lbs CO2/MWh.71 EPA
established a less stringent NSPS for modified coal-fired power plants, limiting CO2 emissions to
the level of the facility’s best historical annual performance from 2002 to the time of modification.
For new natural gas-fired power plants, EPA set an NSPS of 1,000 lbs CO2/MWh, reflecting
application of efficient natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) technology.72
As with the Clean Power Plan, the standards were challenged immediately after they were
issued.73 One of the challengers’ chief contentions was that CCS technologies were not
“adequately demonstrated” and EPA therefore erred in its determination that the BSER should
reflect the application of partial CCS.74

See Clean Air Act § 111(b) (requiring performance standards for “new sources”), § 111(a)(2) (defining “new source”
to include “any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of
regulations), § 111(a)(4) (defining “modification” as “any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of,
a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the
emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted).
70 Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C § 7411(a)(1).
71 80 Fed. Reg. at 64513.
72 Id. at 64515.
73 North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law filed an amicus brief
in this case on behalf of carbon capture and sequestration experts in support of the performance standard. Brief for
Amici Curiae Carbon Capture and Storage Scientists in Support of Respondents, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/MQ9M-BFAM.
74 Petitioner State North Dakota’s Statement of Issues To Be Raised, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
27, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/TWK6-QXB7.
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Pursuant to Executive Order 13783, EPA announced on April 4, 2017, that it was reviewing
the rule, and if appropriate, would initiate proceedings to suspend, revise, or rescind the rule. 75
EPA also submitted a request to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to hold the litigation over this
rule in abeyance pending the outcome of its review process.76 The D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s
request and suspended the litigation indefinitely in August 2017.77
On December 6, 2018, EPA issued a proposed rule to weaken the NSPS, increasing the
emissions rate for coal plants from 1,400 lbs CO2/MWh to 1,900 lbs CO2/MWh for larger units and
2,000 lbs CO2/MWh for smaller units.78 To justify this increase, the Trump EPA reversed course
on the Obama EPA’s determination that CCS is an adequately demonstrated technology. Instead,
EPA has proposed to find that the BSER for this source category is the most efficient demonstrated
steam cycle in combination with the best operating practices. EPA has also asserted that this
proposal would result in “negligible changes” in total CO2 emissions and compliance costs
through 2026, since no new coal-fired power plants are expected to be constructed in that
timeframe (as they have become uneconomical for other reasons).79 In the meantime, the original
CO2 performance standards for new fossil fuel-fired power plants remain in effect.

3. Methane Emission Standards for New Oil and Gas Sources
The oil and gas sector is another major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and
a key contributor of methane (CH4), which is a more potent greenhouse gas than CO2. During the
Obama administration, EPA used its authority under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act to issue
stationary source performance standards for the oil and gas sector as well as the power sector.
EPA finalized NSPS for methane (CH4), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and toxic air

EPA, Review of the Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 16330 (Apr. 4, 2017).
76 Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Rule and Forthcoming Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Cases in
Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/WMC8-PT5M.
77 Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/8ANU-T3DK. See also Order Granting Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/NFX3-286T (initial stay of litigation for 60 days).
78 EPA, Review of Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Pre-Publication Draft), EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495; RIN 2060AT56 (Dec. 6, 2018).
79 Id. at 112.
75
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pollutants from the oil and gas sector on June 3, 2016.80 The NSPS rule established different
performance standards for a variety of oil and gas facilities, including well sites, gathering and
boosting stations, processing plants, and compressor stations. These standards consisted of
emission reduction targets (e.g., 95% reduction in methane emissions from centrifugal
compressors) as well as operational standards (e.g., requiring capture of methane emissions at
well completion, and requiring monitoring for fugitive emissions and repair of leaks).81 EPA
estimated that the rule would reduce 510,000 short tons of methane (11 million tons CO2e) per
year by 2025, yielding corresponding climate benefits of $690 million per year which would
outweigh the estimated costs of $530 million per year.82 As with the other greenhouse gas
standards, the final rule was challenged by industry groups and states on the grounds that it
exceeded EPA’s authority.83
The Trump EPA announced that it was reviewing the rule pursuant to Executive Order
13783 on the same day that it announced the reconsideration process for the power sector
standards.84 EPA also successfully moved to have the initial lawsuit against the rule held in
abeyance pending its review of the rule.85
EPA subsequently issued a Federal Register notice stating that it was granting
reconsideration of certain requirements in the NSPS, specifically the well site pneumatic pump
standards and the requirements for certification by a professional engineer, and that it would stay

EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Final Rule,
81 Fed. Reg. 35824 (June 3, 2016).
81 For a summary of the standards, see 81 Fed. Reg. at 35826.
82 EPA, EPA’s Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions from the Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Final Rules and Draft
Information Collection Request (2016), https://perma.cc/FA55-R3BR.
83 North Dakota v. EPA, No. 16-1242 (D.C. Cir. 2016). See also American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (earlier challenge to 2012 NSPS for oil and gas sector, which was consolidated with North Dakota v. EPA in
2017).
84 EPA, Review of the 2016 Oil and Gas New Source Performance Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 82 Fed. Reg. 16331 (Apr. 4, 2017). EPA also sent a separate letter to fossil fuel companies that had requested
reconsideration of the fugitive emission standards stating that it would grant their request. Letter from EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Convening a Proceeding for Reconsideration of Final Rule, “Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed and Modified Sources,” published June 3, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg.
35824 (Apr. 18, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/8PC3-QEF4.
85 Order Granting Abeyance, American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/2Y74-E6QS.
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those requirements for three months pending reconsideration.86 Environmental groups
challenged the initial stay, and on July 3, 2017, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that EPA
had exceeded its authority by issuing the stay without following the APA’s notice and comment
procedures and ordered EPA to begin implementing the rules.87
EPA followed the initial three-month stay with a proposed rule to stay the NSPS
requirements for two years.88 EPA has not finalized the rule adopting the two-year stay. However,
on March 12, 2018, EPA published a final amendment to the NSPS which would allow leaks to
go unrepaired during unscheduled or emergency shutdowns, and which would also remove
monitoring survey requirements for well sites located on the Alaskan North Slope.89 Notably,
although EPA did solicit comment on these issues in the proposal for the two-year stay, there was
no formal proposal which preceded this final rule. This raises the question of whether EPA failed
to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements when promulgating the March 12 rule.
On October 15, 2018, EPA published a proposed rule to revise the oil and gas NSPS.90 The
proposal would rescind or modify many of the key requirements embedded in the original NSPS,
particularly those pertaining to methane leak detection and repair.91 Two of the key changes
include reductions in how frequently oil and gas operators would be required to survey for
methane leaks, and an extension of time provided for leak repair. EPA has estimated that, if these
proposed changes are implemented, methane emissions from oil and natural gas facilities will

EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Grant of
Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25730 (June 5, 2017).
87 Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
88 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 27645 (June 16, 2017). See also EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector:
Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of Certain Requirements; Notice of Data
Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 51788 (Nov. 8, 2017) (providing supplemental information in support of the stay); EPA, Oil
and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Three Month Stay of
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 27641 (June 16, 2017) (proposing an additional 3-month stay to
ensure that there is no gap between the initial 3-month stay and the start of the 2-year stay) EPA, Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Three Month Stay of Certain
Requirements; Notice of Data Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 51794 (Nov. 8, 2017) (providing supplemental information in
support of the 3-month stay).
89 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources;
Amendments; Final Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 10628 (Mar. 12, 2018).
90 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Proposed
Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 52056 (Oct. 15, 2018).
91 For a more detailed description of the proposed rule, see Romany Webb, Five Important Points About EPA’s Revised
New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Gas Industry, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018).
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increase by 380,000 – 480,000 short tons between 2019 and 2015, equivalent to a 4-5% increase in
total industry methane emissions.92
Apart from the specific provisions addressed in the March 12 rule, most aspects of the
methane NSPS for the oil and gas sector remain in effect, pursuant to the D.C. Circuit’s order. A
lawsuit has not yet been filed to challenge the March 12 rule, possibly due to its limited scope.

4. Methane Emission Standards for Existing Oil and Gas Sources
EPA had commenced work on 111(d) emission guidelines for methane from existing
sources the oil and gas sector during the Obama administration but had not finalized these
guidelines by the time President Trump took office. Specifically, on November 10, 2016, EPA
issued a final Information Collection Request (ICR) to the oil and gas industry seeking
information on the availability and cost of emissions controls for existing sources within this
sector.93 The ICR was the first step in the regulatory process: the intent was to then proceed with
the promulgation of proposed emission guidelines for this source category.
The Trump administration reversed course on the development of this rule. On March 2,
2017, EPA withdrew the ICR and instructed oil and gas companies that they were no longer
required to respond to the queries contained therein.94 Since no formal proposal or rule had been
issued, EPA did not initiate a formal review process like it has for finalized regulations.
On April 5, 2018, fifteen states and the City of Chicago sued EPA for failing to regulate
methane emissions from existing oil and gas operations, arguing that EPA had violated the Clean
Air Act by unreasonably delaying the promulgation of this rule.95 The case was filed with the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral arguments have not yet been scheduled.

5. Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Motor Vehicles
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to issue performance standards for
emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles which, in EPA’s judgment, cause or contribute to

Id.
EPA, Background on the Information Request for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, https://perma.cc/9FYK-LQL9.
94 EPA, Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information, 82 Fed. Reg. 12817 (Mar. 7, 2017).
95 New York et al. v. Pruitt, 1:18-cv-00773 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.96 As
discussed above, Massachusetts v. EPA specifically dealt with EPA’s authority and obligation to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under this section. The positive endangerment finding issued
by EPA following that decision triggered a legal obligation for EPA to promulgate performance
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.
A separate statute requires the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to establish fuel economy standards for motor vehicles.97 Due to the close relationship between
fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions, during the Obama administration EPA and NHTSA
cooperated in a rulemaking process to promulgate joint greenhouse gas emission and corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for motor vehicles. These standards were harmonized
with California’s fuel economy standards so as to promote nationwide consistency, and
California was also granted two waivers under section 209 of the Clean Air Act which provided
the state with independent legal authority to issue the fuel economy standards and also
authorized the state to adopt additional requirements for vehicles as part of its Advanced Clean
Cars Program.98

a. Light Duty Vehicles
On October 16, 2016, EPA and NHTSA adopted joint emission and CAFE standards for
light duty vehicles model years 2017-2025 which increase over time and are expected to result in
an average industry fleetwide level of 163 grams / mile of CO2 by model year 2025, equivalent to
a fuel economy of 54.5 miles per gallon.99 EPA estimated that the standards would reduce

Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7522.
49 U.S.C. § 32902 (“Average Fuel Economy Standards”).
98 EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean
Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for new
Motor Vehicles; Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (Jul. 8, 2009); EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control
Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car
Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2018 and
Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013).
99 EPA & DOT, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 (Oct. 15, 2012).
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greenhouse gas emissions by approximately 2 billion metric tons over the lifetime of the vehicles
sold in these years, resulting in net benefits to society ranging from $326 to $451 billion.100
The light-duty rule called for a mid-term evaluation to determine whether the standards
should be revised for light duty vehicles MY 2022-2025. In January 2017, just before President
Trump took office, EPA completed its mid-term evaluation and issued a final determination in
which it concluded that no change was warranted for the MY 2022-2025 standards.101 Many in
the industry criticized the determination for being rushed, as it came in the final days of the
Obama administration, several months before the expected date offered in the public timeline.
On March 15, 2017, the Trump EPA and NHTSA announced their intention to revisit the
conclusion from the mid-term evaluation.102 On August 10, 2017, EPA and NHTSA announced
that they were opening a public comment period on the reconsideration of the light-duty emission
standards for MY 2022-2025, and that they would take comment on whether the MY 2021
standards were appropriate as well.103 On April 13, 2018, EPA published a notice stating that it
had completed its reconsideration of the mid-term evaluation, that it was withdrawing the
Obama administration’s final determination in the mid-term evaluation because the current
standards were “based on outdated information” and “may be too stringent,” and that it intended
to initiate a new notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding to revise them.104
In May 2018, seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and several environmental groups
filed a lawsuit challenging EPA’s decision to withdraw the Obama administration’s final

EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Regulatory Announcement: EPA and NHTSA Set Standards to Reduce
Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 2017-2025 Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-420-F-12-051 (Aug.
2012), available at https://perma.cc/STR4-QVX3.
101 EPA, Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation, EPA-420-R-17-001 (Jan. 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/34ML-M6F5.
102 NHTSA & EPA, Notice of Intention To Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 (Mar. 22,
2017).
103 EPA Press Release: EPA, DOT Open Comment Period on Reconsideration of GHG Standards for Cars and Light
Trucks (Aug. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/LF7B-PCVP. See also NHTSA & EPA, Request for Comment on
Reconsideration of the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicles; Request for Comment on Model Year 2021 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 39551 (Aug. 21, 2017).
104 EPA, Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16077 (Apr. 13, 2018).
100

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

24

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

determination from the midterm evaluation and issue a new final determination reaching the
opposite conclusion on the reasonableness of the vehicle standards.105 EPA and industry
intervenors have moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the revised final determination was not
a “final agency action” subject to judicial review. The light-duty emission standards remain in
effect pending review by the administration and the outcome of this case. On November 21, 2018,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order allowing the case to proceed without ruling on
the motions to dismiss.106
In August 2018, EPA and NHTSA published a proposed rule to weaken the light-duty
vehicle emission and fuel economy standards. The proposal – entitled the “Safer and Affordable
Efficient Vehicles Proposed Rule for Model years 2021-2026” – would freeze the light-duty vehicle
standards for MY 2021-2026 at 2020 levels, rather than having the standards become more
stringent over time as provided for in the original rule.107 It would also revoke the waiver allowing
California to establish more stringent standards which other states can then adopt. As indicated
by the title of the proposal, the administration’s primary justification for the rule is that it will
make new vehicles more affordable and save lives by increasing access to those new vehicles.
Many governmental and non-governmental organizations have expressed opposition to the rule
and raised serious questions about the underlying economic and safety analyses, and twenty
states have already signaled their intent to sue if the proposal is finalized.108

b. Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles
EPA and NHTSA also promulgated joint CAFE and emission standards for medium- and
heavy-duty vehicles (e.g., large trucks and vans). The standards for heavy-duty vehicles MY
2018-2027 were finalized in August 2016.109 EPA anticipated that the standards would reduce CO2

California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Order, California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2018).
107 EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model years 2021-2026 Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 32817 (Aug. 24, 2018).
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Trump Administration Attacks Consumers, Climate, and
States with Indefensible new Vehicle Proposal (Aug. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/DGW2-JTSK; Press Release, New York
State Attorney General, A.G. Underwood: We Will Sue Over EPA Rollback of Clean Car Rule (Aug. 2, 2018)
(containing joint statement from 20 state attorney generals expressing their intent to sue if this rule is finalized).
109 EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines
and Vehicles—Phase 2; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (Oct. 25, 2016).
105
106

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School

25

A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections

emissions by approximately 1.1 billion tons over the lifetime of vehicles built in these years,
saving vehicle owners an estimated $170 billion in avoided fuel costs and $230 billion in net
benefits to society.110
The Trump Administration has not announced plans to review and potentially revise or
repeal these standards as a general matter. However, responding to industry concerns, EPA
issued a proposal on November 16, 2017 to repeal the emissions standards set for heavy-duty
glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits based on a proposed re-interpretation under which
these items would be found not to constitute “new motor vehicles” under the Clean Air Act. 111
(Glider vehicles employ old engines in new chasses.) This action was taken in direct response to
a petition for review of the application of the rule to gliders submitted by several glider
manufacturing companies on July 11, 2017. EPA also issued a notice to small manufacturers and
suppliers of glider vehicles assuring them that it would not take action to enforce the rule for
these manufactures on July 6, 2018, but this “no action assurance” was immediately stayed by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and then revoked by the Acting EPA Administrator.112
The Trump administration may also soon take action to address another industry
challenge – specifically, with respect to the application of the rule to trailers – which was filed by
several trailer manufacturers in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on December 22, 2016.113 The
D.C. Circuit has granted motions to hold the case in abeyance pending the administration’s
review of that aspect of the rule, and has also stayed the application of the rule to trailers pending
judicial resolution of the case.114

EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Regulatory Announcement: EPA and NHTSA Adopt Standards to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improve Fuel Efficiency of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles for Model Year 2018 and
Beyond, EPA-420-F-16-044 (Aug. 2016), available at https://perma.cc/KQK3-JLQ2.
111 EPA, Proposed Rule; Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits, 82
Fed. Reg. 53442 (Nov. 16, 2017).
112 See EPA, Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small Manufactures of Glider Vehicles (July 6, 2018),
https://perma.cc/2GZC-65YR; Order Granting Administrative Stay, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 18-1190
(D.C. Cir. July 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/WN82-574U; EPA, Withdrawal of Conditional No Action Assurance
Regarding Small Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles (July 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/8XKJ-VA7E.
113 Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
114 Order Granting Abeyance, Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. May 8,
2017), available at https://perma.cc/XJL3-TRMK; Order Continuing Abeyance, Truck Trailer Manufacturers
Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/8WAN-3PAP.
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c. Penalties for Non-Compliance
In addition to the new emissions and fuel economy standards, the Obama administration
also promulgated regulations which increased penalties on automakers that do not comply with
the standards. NHSTA published a final rule on December 28, 2016, which increased the
maximum fines from $5.50 to $14 for every tenth of an mpg and allowed adjustments for inflation
between the publication date and the assessment of the violation.115 The rule was issued in direct
response to a law passed by Congress in 2015 requiring agencies to adjust fines for inflation.116
The Trump administration has since initiated its review of this rule. On July 12, 2017,
NHTSA announced that it would indefinitely delay the effective date of the rule increasing
penalties,117 and in a separate notice, NHTSA announced that it would reconsider and potentially
revise the rule.118 The stated rationale for reconsideration was that the final rule did not
adequately account for potential negative economic impacts caused by increasing the fines.119
Several states and environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging NHTSA’s delay of
the original rule.120 On April 23, 2018, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petitioners’
request and vacated the rule which delayed the effective date for the increased penalties.121 That
initial order was followed by an opinion, dated June 29, 2018, in which the Second Circuit panel
explained that NHTSA lacked authority to indefinitely delay the adjustments to the civil penalties
that were called for by the 2015 statute.122 The panel confronted the Trump administration’s
argument that agencies possess “inherent authority” to reconsider final rules published in the
Federal Register, noting that the agency must always abide by the notice-and-comment provisions
of the APA before taking formal regulatory action of this nature (e.g., delaying, modifying, or
rescinding a rule). In addition, the panel disagreed that it was “in the public interest” for NHTSA

NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Final Rule, Response to Petition for Reconsideration; Response to Petition for
Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 95489 (Dec. 28, 2016).
116 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74 (2015).
117 NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 32139 (July 12, 2017).
118 NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Reconsideration of Final Rule; Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 32140 (July 12, 2017).
119 Id. at 32142.
120 NRDC v. NHTSA, No. 17-2780 (2d Cir. 2017).
121 Order Granting Petitions, NRDC v. NHTSA, No. 17-2780 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2017).
122 NRDC v. NHTSA, 2018 WL 3189321 (2d Cir. 2018)
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to suspend the rule without taking comment, reasoning that the public interest would best be
served through adherence to notice-and-comment procedures.

6. Methane Standards for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills
The Obama EPA issued NSPS and existing source guidelines for municipal solid waste
(MSW) landfills on August 29, 2016.123 The rules require large landfills124 to install and operate a
gas collection system within 30 months after the landfill gas emissions reach a certain threshold.125
The rules also contain provisions pertaining to emissions monitoring and capping and removing
the landfill gas collection-and-control system when the landfill is closed or no longer generating
substantial quantities of emissions. EPA anticipated that the standards would reduce 334,000 tons
CH4 (8.2 million tons CO2e) and 303,000 tons of CO2 per year by 2025.
Industry groups filed an initial challenge to the rule in October 2016.126 The D.C. Circuit
has since granted EPA’s requests to hold the case in abeyance pending its reconsideration of the
rule.127
On May 5, 2017, the Trump EPA announced that it would reconsider certain provisions
of the methane standards for new and existing landfills in response to a petition from industry
groups raising objections to those provisions.128 Specifically, EPA planned to reconsider
requirements for emission monitoring, reporting, and corrective actions, among other things.129
On May 22, 2017, EPA announced a 90-day administrative stay of both standards pending its

EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 59332 (Aug. 29, 2016).
“Large landfills” are those with a capacity of at least 2.5 million metric tons and at least 2.5 million cubic meters of
waste. 81 Fed. Reg. at 59333.
125 Specifically, the requirement kicks in when emissions of non-methane organic compounds reach a threshold of 34
metric tons or more per year. 81 Fed. Reg. at 59334.
126 National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
127 Order Granting Abeyance, National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017);
Order Continuing Abeyance, National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2017).
128 Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Convening a Proceeding for Reconsideration of final rules entitled
"Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 81 Fed. Reg. 59332 and "Emission Guidelines and
Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 81 Fed. Reg. 59276, both published August 29, 2016 (May 5,
2017), https://perma.cc/7S5D-PPC5.
129 Id. at 2.
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reconsideration of the rules pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order on Energy
Independence.130 The 90 day stay expired on August 29, 2017, so the standards remain in effect.
On June 16, 2017, environmental and conservation groups filed a lawsuit challenging
EPA’s decision to stay the landfill methane standards.131 The petitioners eventually agreed to
voluntary dismissal of the case after the stay had expired and EPA withdrew its plans for further
delay in implementation of the standards. The petitioners stipulated that they consented to the
dismissal on the basis of EPA’s representations that the stay only affected deadlines that would
have applied during the 90 days the stay was in effect, that EPA was not aware of new landfills
affected by the stay, and that the stay did not affect deadlines for existing landfills or for EPA
obligations.
Eight states filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California on May 31, 2018, alleging
that EPA had failed to fulfill its statutory duty to implement and enforce the emission guidelines
for existing sources.132 More specifically, petitioners alleged that “instead of working to support
and ensure compliance with the Emission Guidelines, EPA has worked to undermine—for
example, by communicating that it has no intent to respond to state plans or to impose a federal
plan on states that did not impose a state plan—in clear derogation of its statutory and regulatory
duties.”133 To support this allegation, the petitioners cited several examples of EPA’s
implementation failure: (i) EPA had not yet approved any state plans,134 (ii) EPA had failed to
review their state plan submissions or respond to their queries about the development of these
plans,135 (iii) after failing to respond to multiple inquiries from the California Air Resources Board
(CARB), EPA sent a letter to CARB stating that “at this time we do not plan to prioritize the review
of submitted state plans nor are we working to issue a Federal Plan for states that failed to submit
a state plan” and suggesting that it would not prioritize these issues until after it had completed

EPA, Stay of Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills and Emission Guidelines and
Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 82 Fed. Reg. 24878 (May 31, 2017).
131 NRDC v. Pruitt, No. 17-1157 (D.C. Cir 2017).
132 California v. EPA, No. 4:18-cv-03237 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
133 States’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ¶ 3, California v. EPA, No. 4:18-cv-03237 (N.D. Cal. May
31, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/W3L5-LBNN.
134 Id. at ¶ 53.
135 Id. at ¶¶ 49-50.
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its reconsideration of the rule in 2020.136 The district court has not yet issued any rulings in that
case.
EPA has continued to move forward with plans to modify the emission guidelines. On
October 30, 2018, EPA published a proposed rule which would postpone the due date for state
plans promulgated pursuant to the methane emission guidelines from May 30, 2017 to August
29, 2019.137 In that proposal, EPA also took comment on whether it should amend the guidelines
to require states to resubmit their plans in accordance with new guidelines.

C. Product Standards for Hydrofluorocarbons
During the Obama administration, EPA also issued product standards aimed at reducing
the production and use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a particularly potent class of greenhouse
gas emissions. EPA had approved the use of HFCs as a substitute for ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) in the 1990s, pursuant to its
authority under Section 612 of the Clean Air Act. Section 612 establishes a “safe alternatives
policy” which calls for the replacement of ozone depleting substances with alternatives that
“reduce overall risks to human health and the environment.”138 To implement this policy, Section
612 directs EPA to evaluate the effects of potential substitutes to ozone depleting substances and
to designate a list of approved (i.e., safe) alternatives to prohibited ozone depleting substances,
as well as a list of prohibited alternatives.139 This is known as the “Significant New Alternatives
Policy” (SNAP) program.
Since EPA first approved the HFCs as a safe alternative for CFCs and HCFCs, it became
clear that HFCs were not appropriate alternatives because they are potent greenhouse gases. In
light of this new information, EPA issued a new SNAP rule in 2015 in which it moved certain
HFCs with high global warming potential (GWP) from the approved list to the prohibited list and
established deadlines for phasing out the use of these HFCs in applications such as air

Id. at ¶ 52.
EPA, Adopting Subpart Ba Requirements in Emission Guidelines for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills; Proposed
Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 54527 (Oct. 30, 2018).
138 Clean Air Act § 612(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(a).
139 Clean Air Act § 612(c) , 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(c).
136
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conditioning, retail food refrigeration, vending machines, aerosols, and foam blowing.140 In the
same rulemaking, EPA placed several climate-friendlier alternatives on the approved substances
list.141
Two foreign manufacturers of products containing HFCs filed a lawsuit challenging the
2015 rule. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in favor of the petitioners on
August 8, 2017.142 The court upheld EPA’s authority to move HFCs from the list of safe substitutes
to the list of prohibited substitutes based on its assessment of public health and environmental
risks, and in doing so, EPA could prohibit a manufacturer from replacing an ozone depleting
substance with HFCs. However, the court found that Section 612 did not grant EPA the authority
to require manufacturers to replace non-ozone depleting substances such as HFCs with more
environmentally friendly alternatives. The court therefore vacated the rule “to the extent it
requires manufacturers to replace HFCs with a substitute substance” and remanded to EPA for
further proceedings.143 The D.C. Circuit denied a rehearing of this case,144 and the Supreme Court
denied petitions for it to review the decision.145
On April 13, 2018, EPA announced that it would not enforce the HFC alternatives rule
until it completed a supplemental rulemaking to address the D.C. Circuit’s partial vacatur of the
rule.146 Eleven states, the District of Columbia, and NRDC filed a lawsuit challenging EPA’s
decision to suspend enforcement of the HFC restrictions, arguing that EPA could not suspend the
rule in its entirety in response to a partial vacatur.147

EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes Under the Significant
New Alternatives Policy Program; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42870 (July 20, 2015).
141 Id.
142 Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
143 Id. at 454.
144 Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1328 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26,
2018).
145 Certiorari – Summary Dispositions, NRDC v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. et al., No. 18-0002 (S. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018);
Certiorari – Summary Dispositions, Honeywell International v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. et al., No. 17-1703 (S. Ct. Oct. 9,
2018).
146 EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a Stakeholder Meeting Concerning the
Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 18431 (Apr. 27, 2018).
147 NRDC v. Wheeler, No. 18-1172 (D.C. Cir. 2018); New York v. Wheeler, No. 18-1774 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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D. Other Environmental Standards Affecting Fossil Fuel Use
The environmental rules targeted for deregulation by the Trump administration are not
limited to rules aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are other environmental
standards currently under review or revision that have important implications for fossil fuel use
and the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions. These standards help to internalize some of the
externalities associated with fossil fuel use (e.g., by requiring operators of coal-fired plants and
coal ash facilities to pay for pollution control measures) and as a result they create a more level
playing field for other energy sources to compete with fossil fuels. Three examples are discussed
below: The Mercury and Air Toxics Standard and the Coal Ash Rule, both of which are currently
under review, and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which is not being enforced. All three rules
would increase the costs of operating coal-fired power plants, and thus accelerate their retirement
and their replacement by cleaner sources of electricity, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. They
are therefore important components of the efforts to cause the closure of existing coal-fired power
plants, which was a major objective of the Clean Power Plan.

1. Mercury and Air Toxics Standard
EPA issued the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for
coal and oil-fired power plants, commonly referred to as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
(MATS) rule on February 16, 2012.148 The MATS rule requires facilities to achieve an emissions
rate for mercury and air toxics consistent with the implementation of the maximum available
control technology (MACT) for those pollutants. In the same rulemaking, EPA also established
NSPS for criteria pollutants (PM, NOx, and SO2) from fossil fuel-fired electric utility, industrial,
commercial, and institutional steam generating units.
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court ruled that EPA had improperly failed to consider
compliance costs at the outset of developing the MATS rule. The rule was remanded to EPA for

EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-CommercialInstitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304
(Feb. 16, 2012).
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further analysis of costs but remained in effect during the remand.149 On April 25, 2016, EPA
issued a supplemental finding in which it considered compliance costs and concluded that the
MATS rule was appropriate and necessary.150 Industry opponents again sued EPA, arguing that
the rule exceeded EPA’s authority.151
EPA made it clear that it intended to review and potentially revise the rule when it
requested that the D.C. Circuit delay oral arguments in the case noted above to give it time to
review the rule. EPA subsequently requested that the litigation be put on hold pending its review
of the rule, and on April 27, 2017, the D.C. Circuit suspended the case indefinitely.152 On February
7, 2019, EPA published a proposed rule to revise the supplemental cost finding that it had issued
in response to Michigan v. EPA. Completely reversing course from its 2016 finding, EPA is
proposing to determine that the MATS rule is not “appropriate and necessary” based on a revised
analysis in which it has found that the costs of the rule outweigh its benefits.153

2. Coal Ash Rule
On April 17, 2015, the Obama EPA issued a rule regulating the disposal of coal combustion
residuals from electric utilities (commonly known as the “Coal Ash” rule), pursuant to its
authority under Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).154 The rule
established requirements pertaining to the operation of coal ash facilities, structural integrity of
coal ash impoundments, groundwater monitoring and corrective actions, closure and postclosure, and record keeping and public disclosures. While the rule did not regulate emissions
from power plants, it did have the effect of internalizing some of the externalities associated with
coal use (thereby creating additional operating costs for many coal plants).

Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015).
EPA, Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 24420 (Apr. 25, 2016).
151 Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
152 Order Granting Abeyance, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/Q55X-FA83.
153 EPA, Proposed Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review,
84 Fed. Reg. 2670 (Feb. 7, 2019).
154 EPA, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management Systems: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric
Utilities; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 21302 (Apr. 17, 2015).
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The rule was challenged by industry groups, environmental groups, and municipalities
who felt that the rule was either too stringent or not stringent enough.155 After President Trump
took office, industry challengers petitioned EPA to reconsider specific provisions of the rule,
including but not limited to provisions at issue in the case. EPA sent a letter to the challengers
announcing that EPA would reconsider the provisions addressed in their petitions,156 and
subsequently asked the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to postpone oral arguments until it had an
opportunity to review and potentially revise the rule.157 The D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s request,
but not indefinitely.158
During the litigation, EPA has also taken a number of steps to delegate control over coal
ash disposal to state regulators. EPA is taking these actions pursuant to the Water Infrastructure
Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act, enacted in 2016, which authorizes EPA-approved state
permitting programs to regulate coal ash disposal, so long as the state program is as protective
as EPA’s promulgated standards.159 EPA issued interim final guidance for state permit programs
for coal ash disposal on August 15, 2017.160 EPA also published a preliminary approval of
Oklahoma’s application to regulate coal ash in lieu of the federal program on January 16, 2018
(Oklahoma was the first state to seek approval).
On March 1, 2018, EPA proposed amendments to the coal ash rule that would
“incorporate flexibilities” for utilities and states – for example, by allowing state regulators to
make determinations about compliance with coal ash disposal standards. The move towards
granting state regulators greater flexibility and control of the program raises environmental
concerns because many of the states with coal ash contaminated sites and histories of coal ash
spills do not have good track records with respect to implementing and enforcing environmental
protections.161 EPA issued a final rule promulgating many of the proposed amendments on July

Utility Solid Waste Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Petitions Concerning Coal Combustion Residuals Rule (Sept. 13,
2017), available at https://perma.cc/C8QZ-XNZR.
157 Respondents’ Motion to Continue Oral Argument and Hold These Proceedings in Abeyance, Utility Solid Waste
Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/UG9W-ASPG.
158 Order Granting Abeyance, Utility Solid Waste Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2017).
159 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114-332 (Dec. 16, 2016).
160 EPA Office of Land and Emergency Management, Coal Combustion Residuals State Permit Program Guidance
Document; Interim Final (Aug. 2017), available at https://perma.cc/N36N-UTYK.
161 Earthjustice, Coal Ash Contaminated Sites, https://perma.cc/G9CQ-DNSS.
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30, 2018.162 EPA has stated that it intends to initiate a second rulemaking to amend other
provisions of the rule not addressed in this action.163
A legal challenge has not yet been filed in opposition to the final rule amending the coal
ash regulations. However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did issue a decision in the lawsuit
challenging the original coal ash rule which has implications for the amendments issued by the
Trump administration.164 The court held that the original rule was not sufficiently protective of
public health and welfare because it did not require adequate protections for unlined and
partially-lined coal ash pits and some storage facilities were improperly exempted. The court also
rejected all industry claims that the rule was too stringent. EPA thus has a legal obligation to
make the rule more stringent than that which was enacted by the Obama administration, which is
exactly the opposite of what EPA accomplished through the March amendments. Shortly after
that decision was issued, Hurricane Florence caused the release of large amounts of coal ash in
North Carolina; this event may make it even more difficult for the Trump administration to
weaken the standards for coal ash containment.165

3. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) was issued by EPA on August 8, 2011, to help
protect interstate air quality.166 The rule establishes a framework for controlling cross-state
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2) from power plants in upwind states that
contribute to the formation of particulate matter (PM) and ozone pollution in downwind states,
thereby interfering with the downwind states’ ability to attain the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for those pollutants.167 CSAPR allows a downwind state to file a “section 126
petition” asking EPA to regulate pollution from sources in another state when that pollution is

EPA, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric
Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36435 (July 30, 2018).
163 Id. at 36436.
164 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2018).
165 Sharon Lerner, Hurricane Florence Released Tons of Coal Ash in North Carolina. Now the Coal Industry Wants Less
Regulation. THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2018).
166 EPA, Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of
SIP Approvals; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48207 (Aug. 8, 2011).
167 Id.
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impairing air quality in the petitioning state. If EPA determines action is necessary, it can direct
the polluting state to address the problem in its State Implementation Plan (SIP) or impose its
own federal implementation plan (FIP). EPA has since issued several updates to the program,
and in a 2016 update, it recognized that additional action would likely be needed to fully address
upwind states’ obligations to control interstate pollution under the Clean Air Act.168
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of this rule, reversing a D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals decision vacating the rule.169 Following that decision, EPA began implementing Phase I
of the CSAPR in 2014, and was scheduled to begin implementing Phase II – which required
additional emission reductions – in 2017.
The Trump EPA has not taken any formal measures to review and repeal the rule, but it
has also not taken measures to implement and enforce the rule (particularly the Phase II
requirements). Most notably, EPA has not been responding to section 126 petitions in a timely
manner and has rejected or proposed to reject the petitions that it has finally responded to after
lengthy delays.170 Delaware, New York, Connecticut, and Maryland have all sued EPA for
delaying its responses to Section 126 petitions.171 Multiple orders have been issued in these cases

In December 2011, EPA supplemented the final rule to cover additional states for certain pollution. EPA has also
issued minor revisions to the rule’s compliance deadlines since it has been finalized. As of January 2017, the CSAPR
requires 28 states in the eastern United States to reduce power plant emissions of SO 2, annual NOX, and ozone
seasonal NOX affecting downwind states. See EPA, Federal Implementation Plans for Iowa, Michigan, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin and Determination for Kansas Regarding Interstate Transport of Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg.
80760 (Dec. 27, 2011); EPA, Rulemaking To Affirm Interim Amendments to Dates in Federal Implementation Plans
Addressing Interstate Transport of Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter, 81 Fed. Reg. 13275 (Mar. 14, 2016).
169 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
170 For a detailed timeline of state petitions, EPA extensions and responses, and lawsuits, see Harvard Regulatory
Rollback Tracker, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and Section 126 Petitions, https://perma.cc/3LDW-79TK. See also EPA,
Response to June 1, 2016 Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petition From Connecticut; Notice of Final Action, 83 Fed. Reg.
16064 (Apr. 13, 2018); EPA, Response to Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petitions From Delaware and Maryland; Notice
of Proposed Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 26666 (June 8, 2018).
171 Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. 2017); Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Delaware v.
EPA, No. 17-1644 (3d Cir. 2017); New York et al. v. EPA, No. 18-cv-00406 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Connecticut v. Pruitt et al.,
No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. 2017).
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requiring EPA to respond to the petitions,172 but EPA has thus far responded to the court orders
by rejecting the petitions from Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland.173
EPA has taken several other noteworthy actions with respect to the CSAPR rule. On July
10, 2018, following up on its prior finding that additional revisions to the rule would likely be
needed to address certain states’ obligations regarding interstate air pollution, EPA published a
proposed determination that the rule fully addresses those states’ obligations and that “with the
CSAPR fully implemented, these states are not expected to contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other state with regard to the 2008 ozone
NAAQS.”174 In other words, EPA is arguing that there is no need for any updates to the CSAPR
program, despite the implementation and enforcement problems outlined above. Downwind
states have already expressed opposition to this determination.175 On December 21, 2018, EPA
issued a final determination containing the same conclusion.176 Shortly thereafter, the states of
New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, and the City of
New York filed a lawsuit challenging this final determination on the grounds that it was
unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious and must therefore be vacated.177
EPA has also sought to modify CSPAR procedures with revised guidance. On August 31,
2018, EPA issued a memorandum in which it recommended that regional offices use a higher
threshold level when determining whether ozone in an upwind state contributes significantly to

See Memorandum, Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. June 13, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/B9K4W5F2; Opinion and Order, New York et al. v. Pruitt, No. 18-cv-00406 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018); Order, Connecticut v.
Pruitt et al., No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2018).
173 See, e.g., EPA, Response to June 1, 2016, Clean Air Act Petition from Connecticut; Notice of Final Action on
Petition, 83 Fed. Reg. 16064 (Apr. 13, 2018); EPA, Response to Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petitions from Delaware
and Maryland; Notice of Final Action on Petition, 83 Fed. Reg. 50444 (Oct. 5, 2018).
174 EPA, Determination Regarding Good Neighbor Obligations for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 31915 (July 10, 2018).
175 See, e.g., Press Release: Statement from Senator Tom Carper (D-Del) on EPA’s Decision to Deny Further Action on
Cross-State Air Pollution (June 29, 2018). EPA also decided not to revisit a 2015 rule governing state implementation
of primary and secondary ozone NAAQS despite prior statements from the Trump Administration indicating that it
would revisit that rule. Sonal Patel, EPA Will Not Revisit Obama-Era NAAQS for Ozone, POWER MAGAZINE (Aug. 2,
2018)
176 EPA, Determination Regarding Good Neighbor Obligations for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 65878 (Dec. 21, 2018).
177 New York et al. v. EPA, No. 19-1019 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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nonattainment in a downwind state.178 Specifically, the memorandum recommends using a
threshold of 1 part per billion (ppb) instead of 0.70 ppb – an increase of nearly 50 percent.

E. Biomass and Wood Burning Stove Policies
On April 23, 2018, then-Administrator Scott Pruitt issued a policy memorandum which
stated that EPA would treat CO2 emissions associated with the use of forest biomass for energy
by stationary sources as carbon neutral in future regulatory actions and EPA programs.179 EPA
adopted this policy despite the fact that EPA’s own science advisors warned that this policy is
“inconsistent with the underlying science” showing that forest biomass generates net CO 2
emissions.180 The new policy is consistent with a directive contained in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2018 (H.R. 1625) instructing EPA and other agencies to establish policies that
“reflect the carbon-neutrality of forest bioenergy and recognize biomass as a renewable energy
source.”181
On November 1, 2018, EPA, DOE, and USDA sent a letter to Congress outlining how they
are carrying out the Congressional mandate mentioned above to ensure that policies “reflect the
carbon-neutrality of forest bioenergy and recognize biomass as a renewable energy source.” The
letter states that these agencies “will encourage the use of biomass as an energy solution, striving
for consistency across federal policies and programs.”182 EPA is currently preparing to propose
a slate of changes to existing emissions standards for new wood stoves and other wood-fired
heating appliances, but the precise details of these changes have not yet been released.183

EPA, Memorandum: Analysis of Contribution Thresholds for Use in Clean Air Act Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) Interstate
Transport State Implementation Plan Submissions for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Aug. 1, 2018).
179 EPA’s Treatment of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions from Stationary Sources that Use Forest Biomass
for Energy Production (April 23, 2018); Press Release: Administrator Pruitt Promotes Environmental Stewardship
with Forestry Leaders and Students in Georgia (April 23, 2018).
180 EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB), SAB Review of Framework for Assessing Biogenic CO2 Emissions from Stationary
Sources (2014). See also Jennifer Dlouhy, Trump Backs Wood Power Scientists Call Dirtier Than Coal, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1,
2018); Chelsea Harvey & NiinaHeikkinen, Congress Says Biomass is Carbon Neutral But Scientists Disagree, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Mar. 23, 2018).
181 Consolidated Appropriates Act, H.R. 1625, 115 th Cong. § 431 (2018).
182 Letter from EPA Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler and others to Chairman Richard C. Shelby and others
(November 1, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/N5FP-6STZ.
183 Sean Reilly, White House Clears EPA Wood Stove Proposals, E&E NEWS (Nov. 19, 2018). The White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has completed appraisals of two related rulemakings: a proposed rule to
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IV. Department of Interior
A. Cross-Cutting Policies and Programs
DOI is responsible for managing and the use and conservation of natural resources and
public lands the U.S., including the production of fossil fuels on federal lands and waters. The
Obama administration took a number of actions impacting fossil fuel production on federal land,
often justified by climate considerations.184 The Trump administration has sought to reverse the
direction of policy under the DOI. More specifically, under the Trump administration, DOI has
used its authority to remove barriers to and promote the development of the nation’s energy
resources under the mantra of “energy dominance.”185 It has issued several cross-cutting policies
to guide implementation at its constituent agencies. These include:
Secretarial Order 3349, issued on March 29, 2017, implements the directive from President
Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence and Economic Growth to “immediately
review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or use of domestically
produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly
burden the development of domestic energy resources beyond the degree necessary to protect
the public interest or otherwise comply with the law.” The order calls for a reexamination of the
mitigation and climate change policies and guidance that the Department of Interior issued

postpone compliance dates for the wood burning stove emission standards, and an ANPR to solicit comment on
“issues raised by the public” with respect to the standards.
184 There is an active debate about whether supply-side measures aimed at restricting fossil fuel production will
actually reduce fossil fuel consumption and the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions. Those who favor supplyside restrictions argue that constraints on the supply of fossil fuels will increase the price of fossil fuels, thereby
decreasing demand for and consumption of fossil fuels vis-à-vis cleaner energy sources. They also argue that supplyside restrictions can help avoid fossil fuel “lock-in” (i.e., investments in fossil fuel infrastructure and ongoing reliance
on fossil fuels for energy needs). Those who oppose supply-side restrictions argue that such measures will not
meaningfully affect fossil fuel consumption or greenhouse gas emissions because other sources of fuels (e.g., from
private land or other countries) would serve as a substitute if the federal reserves are not exploited. Some have also
argued that increasing federal oil and gas production may even reduce greenhouse gas emissions because: (i)
lifecycle emissions for U.S. oil and gas are lower than lifecycle emissions from foreign oil and gas (particularly oil and
gas imports); and (ii) the availability of cheaper natural gas will result in the substitution of natural gas for coal.
185 See DOI, About: Mission, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare (last visited June 3, 2019) (“promot[ing] energy
dominance” is the first major goal outlined for DOI).
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during the Obama administration, as well as all regulations related to U.S. oil and natural gas
development.186
Secretarial Order No. 3351, issued on May 1, 2017, establishes a new position (Counselor
to the Secretary for Energy Policy) to help implement policies related to energy development,
whose duties include: “[d]eveloping and coordinating strategies, policies, and practices that
promote responsible development of all types of energy on public lands managed and
administered by the Department;” “[i]dentifying regulatory burdens that unnecessarily
encumber energy exploration development, production, transportation; and developing
strategies to eliminate or minimize these burdens;” and “[p]romoting efficient and effective
processing of energy-related authorizations, permits, regulations, and agreements.”187
Secretarial Order 3360, issued on December 22, 2017, rescinds the DOI’s climate and
mitigation policies, including the Departmental Manual on Climate Change Policy, Departmental
Manual on Landscape-Scale Mitigation Policy, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Mitigation Manual, and BLM Mitigation Handbook. The order also directs BLM to review the
Draft Regional Mitigation Strategy for the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and begin
revisions to ensure it is consistent with the administration’s energy dominance goals.188
Some of the more targeted actions undertaken by DOI and its constituent agencies to
implement these policies are discussed below.

B. Removing Barriers to Fossil Fuel Development
1. Moratorium and Programmatic Review of Federal Coal Leasing
During the Obama administration, serious concerns were raised about the cumulative
effects of the federal coal leasing program and whether the program was serving the public
interest. Responding to these concerns, DOI issued Sectorial Order 3338 on January 15, 2016,
which directed the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to prepare a Programmatic
DOI Secretarial Order No. 3349: American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/9N8A-FGL3.
187 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3351: Strengthening the Department of Interior’s Energy Portfolio (May 1, 2017),
available at https://perma.cc/T7WP-LH63.
188 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3360: Rescinding Authorities Inconsistent with Secretary’s Order 3349, “American
Energy Independence” (Dec. 22, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/6FKY-LH4U.
186
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Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) analyzing the cumulative effects of the program as well
as potential leasing and management reforms that could be enacted to mitigate adverse effects.189
One key issue to be addressed in the PEIS was the effect of federal coal leasing on greenhouse gas
emissions, including emissions from the production and consumption of federal coal, and how
the program should be updated to account for those impacts. DOI also announced a moratorium
on federal coal leasing during the environmental review and reform process.190 BLM commenced
the environmental review process in early 2016 and published a scoping document in January
2017 outlining the key issues to be considered in the PEIS.191
President Trump’s Executive Order 13771 directed DOI to “take all steps necessary and
appropriate to amend or withdraw” Secretarial Order 3338, consistent with the President’s goals
of promoting domestic energy production and revitalizing the coal industry. The order also
directed DOI to “lift any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing activities related to Order
3338.” On March 29, 2017, DOI issued Secretarial Order 3348, which revoked Order 3338 and
terminated both the moratorium on federal coal leasing and the programmatic environmental
review process that had been initiated by BLM.192
By terminating the programmatic review, DOI revived a 2014 lawsuit aimed at compelling
the federal government to conduct a programmatic review of the coal leasing program.193 The
plaintiffs argued that a PEIS was required by NEPA because BLM had not comprehensively
analyzed the environmental impacts of the coal leasing program since 1979 and the 1979 analysis
was insufficient because it “only briefly discussed the then-nascent science of the effects of
greenhouse gas emissions and the federal coal management program’s emissions.”194 In 2015, the
case was dismissed by a district court judge who reasoned that there was no ongoing major

DOI Secretarial Order No. 3338 (2016), supra note 17.
DOI, Fact Sheet: Modernizing the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 16, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/UGX3-X6FS.
191 BLM, Federal Coal Program Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement – Scoping Report (Jan. 2017), available
at https://perma.cc/J2DJ-WVN2 (Vol. 1) and https://perma.cc/T7E2-LENY (Vol. 2).
192 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3348: Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/7QLC-J888.
193 Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv-1993 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
194 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv1993 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 24, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/Q2ZZ-MUKU.
189
190
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federal action that triggered the requirement for supplemental review.195 The petitioners appealed
to the D.C. Circuit but the case was placed in abeyance when DOI announced that it would
prepare a PEIS for the program. It was subsequently revived after DOI reversed course and
terminated the PEIS.
On June 19, 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s original
decision and held that NEPA did not require a supplemental programmatic analysis because the
relevant “major Federal action” was completed in 1979 and no new action had been proposed.196
The panel noted that the plaintiffs had raised a “compelling argument” that BLM “should now
revisit the issue” of climate change and “adopt a new program or supplement its PEIS analysis”
but concluded that the plaintiffs would have to pursue this goal through other channels – for
example, by challenging specific licensing decisions that are tiered to the outdated 1979 PEIS.197
However, on April 14, 2019, a district court in Montana held that the administration’s
decision to terminate the federal coal leasing moratorium (specifically Secretarial Order 3348) was
a major federal action which triggered NEPA requirements.198 The court found that the
administration had “circumvented an environmental analysis by characterizing the [order] as a
mere policy shift and return to the status quo” and that this was a final agency action which
would have immediate, real-world consequences including potentially significant environmental
impacts. The court did not specify what form the NEPA review should take but rather remanded
to DOI to determine, in the first instance, how to comply with their NEPA obligations.199

Memorandum Opinion, Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv-1993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27,
2015), available at https://perma.cc/ZM6E-Y8FT.
196 Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
197 Id. at 1244.
198 Citizens for Clean Energy v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. April 19, 2019).
199 One month after that decision, BLM published a draft environmental assessment for lifting the federal coal leasing
moratorium it which it claims that this action does not have significant environmental impacts because it is simply
reinstating coal leasing earlier than it otherwise would have (the assumption being that the moratorium would have
ended by March 2019 upon completion of a PEIS) and thus its action only changes the timing of impacts. BLM only
provided a 15-day comment period for the draft EA. See BLM, Lifting the Pause on the Issuance of New Federal Coal
Leases for Thermal (Steam) Coal: Environmental Assessment, DOI-BLM-WO-WO2100-2019-0001-EA (May 22, 2019).
195
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2. Methane Emission Controls for Oil and Gas Sources
During the Obama administration, DOI also took steps to address greenhouse gas
emissions from oil and gas development on federal lands. The most notable climate protection
was BLM’s Methane Waste Prevention Rule, published on November 18, 2016.200 The rule aimed
to reduce waste of natural gas (methane) from oil and gas production activities on federal and
tribal land by imposing new requirements for flaring, capture, leak detection, and venting. BLM
projected that the rule could eliminate 175,000-180,000 tons of methane (4.4-4.5 million tons CO2e)
annually. These requirements were complementary to the requirements set forth in EPA’s
methane NSPS for the oil and gas sector, one key difference being the scope of the two rules: the
EPA rule applies to new and modified sources regardless of where they are located, whereas the
BLM rule applies to all types of sources (new, modified, and existing) located on federal lands.
The BLM rule was challenged by states and industry groups when it was first issued. 201
On April 4, 2018, the district court in Wyoming reviewing the rule agreed to put the case on hold
pending the administration’s review of the rule.202 The district court also stayed implementation
of certain provisions of the rule during this time, specifically the rules pertaining to:
•

Gas capture and percentage requirements203

•

Measuring and reporting volumes of gas vented or flared204

•

Equipment requirements for pneumatic controllers,205 pneumatic diaphragm pumps,206
and storage vessels207

•

Leak detection and repairs208

The district court’s order was appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but the appeal was
dismissed as moot when BLM issued a final rule to replace the 2016 rule.209
BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg.
83008 (Nov. 18, 2016).
201 Wyoming vs. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. 2016).
202 Order Staying Implementation of Rule Provisions and Staying Action Pending Finalization of Revision Rule,
Wyoming vs. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018).
203 43 CFR § 3179.7.
204 43 CFR § 3179.9.
205 43 CFR § 3179.201.
206 43 CFR § 3179.202.
207 43 CFR § 3179.203.
208 43 CFR §§ 3179.301 – 3179.305.
209 Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 18-8027 (10th Cir. 2019).
200
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The methane waste rule also came under attack by federal legislators. On February 3, 2017,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution to repeal the rule using the Congressional
Review Act (CRA).210 However, the Senate ultimately voted against this resolution.211
Shortly thereafter, the Trump administration initiated proceedings to revise or repeal the
rule. President Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence explicitly called for the review
of this rule. DOI Secretarial Order 3349 (March 29, 2017) therefore instructed BLM to review the
methane waste prevention rule and report on whether the rule is fully consistent with the
executive order’s policy of promoting domestic energy production.
On June 15, 2017, BLM issued a Federal Register notice announcing that it was temporarily
postponing the compliance dates for certain provisions of the rule pending the outcome of
litigation over the rule.212 States successfully challenged this initial postponement of the rule – a
district court in the northern district of California held that the postponement was unlawful under
the APA.213 Despite the court ruling, the BLM continued with its course of action: on October 5,
2017, BLM issued a formal proposal to suspend key requirements of the rule until January 17,
2019,214 and on December 8, 2017, BLM finalized that proposal.215 States also challenged this
suspension rule, and the district court in the northern district of California issued a preliminary
injunction against the rule.216
As litigation has progressed, BLM has continued to move forward with proposed
revisions to the rule. On February 22, 2018, BLM published a proposal to rescind several major

H.J. Res. 36, Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the final rule
of the Bureau of Land Management relating to "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation", 115th Congress (2017-2018).
211 S.J.Res.11 - A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States
Code, of the final rule of the Bureau of Land Management relating to "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation", 115th Congress (2018-2018).
212 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain
Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27430 (June 15, 2017).
213 California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-03804 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
214 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay and Suspension of
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46458 (Oct. 5, 2017).
215 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay and Suspension of
Certain Requirements; Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 58050 (Jan. 8, 2018).
216 California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-07186 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The government appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals but then requested voluntary dismissal of the appeal after publishing the final rule amendments.
California v. BLM, No. 18-15711 (9th Cir. 2018).
210
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provisions, including those governing leak detection and repair and the preparation of methane
waste minimization plans, and to substantially revise other provisions, including those dealing
with the amount of methane that can be released through venting and flaring.217 The amendments
would effectively gut the 2016 rule and reinstate the less stringent standards that were in place
for oil and gas operations prior to its issuance. BLM issued a final rule implementing these
changes on September 28, 2018.218
States and environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging BLM’s decision to repeal key
provisions of the rule, alleging violations of the APA, the Mineral Leasing Act, and NEPA.219 The
chief allegations are that BLM violated the APA by failing to offer a reasoned explanation for
reversing its previous determination that the Methane Waste Prevention Rule was necessary to
fulfill its statutory mandates, the revised metrics that BLM used to calculate the social cost of
methane in order to justify the amendments were not based on the best available science, and
BLM’s conclusion that the repeal would not have significant environmental impacts violated
NEPA.

3. Streamlining Fossil Fuel Permitting
During the Trump administration, DOI and its constituent agencies have also
implemented internal policy changes aimed at streamlining its approval of fossil fuel leases. The
cross-cutting Secretarial Order 3351 and 3360, discussed above, laid the groundwork for these
internal changes. In particular, Secretarial Order 3351 established the Counselor to the Secretary
for Energy Policy and tasked this new official with “[p]romoting efficient and effective processing
of energy-related authorizations, permits, regulations, and agreements,”220 and Secretarial Order
3360 withdrew DOI’s climate and mitigation policies (which contained procedural and
substantive requirements aimed at mitigating harmful environmental effects from DOI land use

BLM, Proposed Rule; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or
Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018).
218 BLM, Final Rule; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018).
219 California v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018); Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05984 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2018).
220 DOI Secretarial Order 3351 (2017), supra note 187.
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decisions, including effects on climate).221 BLM subsequently implemented Secretarial Order 3360
by publishing a new instruction memorandum which prohibits BLM from requiring
compensatory mitigation from public land users except where the law specifically requires – a
policy change which will ultimately make it easier and less costly to develop fossil fuels on federal
lands.222
DOI has also issued two orders specifically aimed at expediting fossil fuel leasing on
federal lands and waters:
•

Secretarial Order No. 3350, which directs the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM) to develop a new five-year plan for oil and gas exploration in offshore waters and
to reconsider a number of regulations governing those activities, pursuant to President
Trump’s Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy.

•

Secretarial Order No. 3354, which directs BLM to “support and improve implementation”
of quarterly oil and gas lease sales, to “identify options to improve the Federal onshore oil
and gas leasing program… as well as identify additional steps to enhance exploration and
development of Federal onshore oil and gas resources,” and “develop an effective strategy
to address permitting applications efficiently and effectively as well as develop clear and
actionable goals for reducing the permit processing time.”223
Pursuant to Order No. 3354, BLM issued an instruction memorandum to its field offices

on January 31, 2018, which establishes a BLM policy “to simplify and streamline the leasing
process [for oil and gas] to alleviate unnecessary impediments and burdens, to expedite the
offering of lands for lease, and to ensure quarterly oil and gas lease sales are consistently held.”224
The memorandum eliminates the use of Master Leasing Plans (MLPs) — a planning approach
introduced by the Obama Administration to manage oil and gas activity on sensitive landscapes,

DOI Secretarial Order 3360 (2017), supra note 188.
BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2019-094: Compensatory Mitigation (July 24, 2018).
223 DOI Secretarial Order 3354: Strengthening and Improving the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program and
Federal Solid Mineral Leasing Program (July 5, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/AH4H-A6QE.
224 BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034: Updating Oil and Gas Leasing Reform – Land use Planning and
Lease Parcel Reviews (Jan. 31, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/YNP2-4KSW. The U.S. Forest Service has also
signaled its intent to modify its regulations in order to streamline and expedite the issuance of oil and gas permits on
National Forest lands. See USFS, Oil and Gas Resources; ANPR, 83 Fed. Reg. 46458 (Sept. 13, 2018).
221
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such as national parks, and avoid harmful impacts to sensitive resources.225 The MLPs were used
to identify and resolve conflicts with resource values such as watersheds and wildlife habitats
through scientific assessment and stakeholder engagement.226 Prior to the introduction of MLPs,
BLM made leasing decisions based on Resource Management Plans (RMPs) which specified
appropriate uses for BLM land units. RMPs are also based on scientific assessment and
stakeholder engagement. However, RMPs are only updated every 20-30 years, they apply to large
geographic areas, and they manage many different land uses. BLM therefore introduced the MLP
process to provide a more tailored and efficient framework for evaluating and managing fossil
fuel leasing decisions. Since the MLP process was eliminated, BLM has returned to using RMPs
for this purpose.
The instruction memorandum also reduces the amount of time that BLM field offices have
to review environmental impacts and receive public feedback. It limits the timeframe for parcel
review for a specific lease sale to six months and limits the amount of time allotted for public
protest of lease sales to ten days after notice is posted. It also seeks to eliminate opportunities for
public review and disclosure of environmental impacts from oil and gas development on public
lands. Specifically, the memorandum states that, where a lease is offered in conformance with an
approved resource management plan (RMP) that underwent NEPA review, field officers can
issue a Determination of NEPA Adequacy (DNA) in lieu of preparing an environmental
assessment (EA) or EIS.227 As discussed below, agencies within DOI have also sought to curtail
the scope of climate change analysis in NEPA reviews.
BLM attempted to apply this new policy in issuing oil and gas leases in the habitat of the
sage grouse – a bird that is in decline across North America due to habitat loss, but which the
federal government declined to list as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) on the grounds that existing RMPs covering sage grouse habitat on federal lands

Id.
The decision to eliminate the use of MLPs was based on a report issued by the Department of Interior last fall
which outlined regulatory “burdens” to energy development (which included the MLPs). The report was prepared in
order to comply with President Trump’s President Trump’s Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth. See DOI, FINAL REPORT: REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ACTIONS THAT POTENTIALLY
BURDEN DOMESTIC ENERGY (Oct. 24, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/G6JR-K6C7.
227 BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034 (2018), supra note 224, at § 4.
225
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provided adequate protections for the birds. Environmental groups filed suit, alleging, among
other things, that the application of the new BLM leasing policy in this context was unlawful. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction on September 21, 2018
prohibiting BLM from applying the new policy to oil and gas leases in sage grouse habitat.228

4. Curtailing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Analyses in Environmental Reviews
As noted above, DOI terminated the PEIS for the federal coal leasing program, and BLM
adopted guidance seeking to reduce the number of EISs and EAs prepared for fossil fuel leasing
decisions – both actions are indicative of the current administration’s desire to avoid
environmental reviews of fossil fuel-related proposals
DOI and its constituent agencies have also attempted to curtail their analysis of
greenhouse gas emissions in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel-related proposals to avoid issuing
findings that these decisions have a significant impact on greenhouse gases. Granted, even if the
agencies concluded that leasing decisions did have a significant impact on greenhouse gases,
NEPA does not require the agencies to mitigate that impact or select a more environmentally
friendly action. But a finding of significant impact could have political ramifications and could
also affect future determinations about how and whether to proceed with federal fossil fuel
leasing in light of environmental and social concerns.
There are several ways in which DOI agencies have limited the greenhouse gas analysis
in NEPA documents. One approach has been to simply ignore indirect emissions from the
processing, transportation, and consumption of fuels produced on federal lands (often referred
to as “downstream emissions”). This was common practice across many agencies even during
the Obama administration, but there are now numerous court decisions challenging that
practice.229

Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv-00187 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2018).
For a review of court decisions through 2016, see Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARVARD ENVTL. L.J. 109 (2017). See also WildEarth
Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222outerc (10th Cir. 2017); Montana Environmental
Information Center v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, 274 F.Supp.3d 1074, 1097-99 (D. Mt. Aug. 14, 2017); Western
Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM, No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018); San
Juan Citizens All. v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 16-CV-376-MCA-JHR, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. June
228
229
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In the wake of those decisions, it is legally risky for agencies to ignore downstream
emissions. However, there are other arguments for “disregarding” downstream emissions. In
particular, the agencies that conduct reviews for fossil fuel leasing (primarily BLM and BOEM)
have argued in these reviews that fossil fuels would be produced and consumed at similar rates
regardless of whether the federal government authorizes production of fuels on public lands, and
thus the net emissions impact of a federal leasing decision is very small or nonexistent. Courts
have rejected unsubstantiated assumptions that federal coal leasing has no effect on emissions due
to “perfect substitution” of other coal resources (because economic data suggests that an increase
in federal production would have some impact on coal prices and consumption),230 but agencies
are now using economic models to support their conclusions that fossil fuel leasing has minor net
emissions impacts.231 Opponents of fossil fuel development have raised serious concerns about
the assumptions underpinning these models and the lack of transparency in the agency analysis,
particularly the assumptions about energy substitutes.232 They have also raised questions about
whether it makes sense to look at “net emissions” in this fashion, given the inherent uncertainties
in the analysis, as opposed to simply calculating the total downstream emissions generated by
the processing, transportation, and use of fossil fuels produced from federal lands and waters.
Agencies have also avoided issuing significance determinations for greenhouse gas
emissions from fossil fuel leases by arguing that: (i) there is no defined threshold for gauging the
significance of those emissions, and (ii) the emissions are relatively small in proportion to overall
global, national, state, or sectoral emissions. There are in fact tools that agencies could use to
assess the significance of emissions – these include the significance criteria outlined in the NEPA
regulations;233 EPA’s threshold which it uses to identify major emitters for the purposes of
14, 2018); Wilderness Workshop v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:16-cv-01822-WYD (D. Colo. Oct. 17,
2018).
230 WildEarth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2017); High Country
Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1197 (D. Colo. 2014).
231 See, e.g., E. WOLVOVSKY & W. ANDERSON, OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS: POTENTIAL LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, BOEM OCS Report 2016-065 (2016).
232 Consider the example of natural gas production: if an agency assumes that the produced natural gas would offset
the use of renewables as well as other fossil fuels, then the net emissions will be much higher than if the agency only
looks at offsetting effects on fossil fuels.
233 The NEPA regulations instruct agencies to consider both the context and intensity of the emissions. Intensity could
be assessed using the other tools noted in this paragraph. Contextual factors which are relevant to any proposal
which would increase the production of fossil fuels include: (i) the fact that climate change is such a massive
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greenhouse gas emission reporting (25,000 tons CO2e per year);234 the metrics for calculating the
social cost of carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide (which have been upheld by courts for use in
regulatory and environmental analyses, though the Trump administration has been moving
away from use of these metrics);235 and EPA’s GHG Equivalencies Calculator (which could be
used to compare emissions from the proposal with, e.g., emissions from household electricity use
or vehicle miles driven).236 However, no courts have yet addressed the issue of whether agencies’
failure to issue significance determinations for greenhouse gas emissions constitutes a violation
of NEPA.
These issues are not unique to DOI reviews – DOE and FERC, which are responsible for
conducting reviews of natural gas transportation infrastructure and export terminals, have
adopted similar arguments in their reviews.237

5. Rescinding the Coal, Oil, and Gas Valuation Rule
In 2016, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) within DOI issued a rule aimed
at improving valuation of coal, oil, and gas produced from federal leases and coal produced from
Indian leases. 238 The original rule sought to ensure that states and the federal government would
receive the full value of royalties due for oil, gas, and coal extracted from public lands by
amending a provision that allowed companies to avoid royalty payments in certain contexts.239

environmental problem; (ii) the broad scope of interests that will be adversely affected by this problem, and (iii) the
compelling need to rapidly reduce dependency on fossil fuels to address this problem. 40 CFR § 1508.27.
234 EPA, GHG Reporting Program Facts and Figures, https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/key-facts-and-figures
235 See Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Technical
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (May 2013,
Revised August 2016); Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Addendum to Technical
Support Document on Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866:
Application of the Methodology to Estimate the Social Cost of Methane and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (Aug.
2016). See also Zero Zone Inc. v. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding use of the metrics derived
by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon); Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S.
Office of Surface Mining, 274 F.Supp.3d 1074 (D. Montana 2017) (requiring disclosure of GHG costs in NEPA review
where benefits were also disclosed, and citing the federal Social Cost of Carbon as an available disclosure tool); High
Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service, 52 F.Supp.3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) (same).
236 EPA, GHG Equivalencies Calculator, https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator.
237 See infra section V.
238 ONRR, Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg.
43337 (July 1, 2016).
239 Id.
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ONRR estimated that the rule would increase royalty collections by between $71.9 million and
$84.8 million annually.240
ONRR quickly reversed course on the rule after President Trump took office. On February
27, 2017, ONRR published a Federal Register notice stating that “justice require[d] it” to postpone
the effective date of the valuation rule, citing the fact that lawsuits challenging the rule raised
“serious questions concerning the validity or prudent of certain provisions.”241 ONRR then
published a proposal to “repeal the [rule] in its entirety” on April 4, 2017,242 and a final rule to
this effect on August 7, 2017.243
California and New Mexico filed a lawsuit challenging the postponement as a violation
of the APA. The reviewing judge agreed that it violated the APA but declined to vacate the notice
in light of ONRR’s decision to repeal the rule (which had been finalized before the court issued
its decision).244 California and New Mexico also filed a lawsuit challenging the repeal of the
valuation rule. On March 29, 2019, a district court in the Northern District of California held that
the repeal was arbitrary and capricious because DOI had failed to explain the inconsistencies
between its prior findings in enacting the valuation rule and its decision to repeal the rule.245 In
the wake of this decision, ONRR officials are reported to have signaled that they may propose a
replacement rather than a full repeal of the valuation rule.246

6. Removing Protections for Endangered Species
On July 19, 2018, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a proposal
to amend their implementing regulations for the Endangered Species Act (ESA).247 The proposed
Id. at 43359.
ONRR, Postponement of Effectiveness of the Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation
Reform 2017 Valuation Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 11823 (Feb. 27, 2017).
242 ONRR, Proposed Rule: Repeal of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform
Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 16323 (Apr. 4, 2017).
243 Repeal of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg.
36834 (Aug. 7, 2017).
244 Becerra v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
245 California et al v. DOI et al, No. C17-5948 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
246 Pamela King, Courts Derail Trump’s March to ‘Energy Dominance’, E&E NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019).
247 FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35193 (July 25, 2018); FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule;
240
241
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amendments would modify key requirements pertaining to listing determinations, critical habitat
designations, interagency consultations, and taking prohibitions, ultimately weakening
protections for species and making it easier for public and private projects to proceed despite the
potential for adverse impacts on threatened and endangered species (or species which would be
listed as such prior to these amendments). For example, the proposed amendments would repeal
language which required that agencies make listing determinations “without reference to the
possible economic or other impacts of such determinations” (thus allowing agencies to consider
economic impacts in listing decisions).248 The amendments would also limit agency discretion to
rely on future impacts as a basis for listing decisions and to designate habitat outside of the
species’ present range, thus making it harder to for agencies to account for climate change in
listings and critical habitat designations.249
The Trump administration has not formally acknowledged any nexus between the
proposed ESA amendments and the President’s energy agenda, but the amendments, if adopted,
would make it easier to develop fossil fuels on both public and private lands by removing barriers
associated with the protection of threatened and endangered species. Recognizing this, the fossil
fuel industry has long lobbied for the weakening of ESA regulations.250 It should also be noted
that other parties have also sought modifications to the ESA, and ESA requirements can impede
not only fossil fuel infrastructure but also renewable energy facilities and other projects aimed at
mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change.

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of Regulations for Interagency Cooperation, 83 Fed. Reg.
35178 (July 15, 2018); FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Revision of the
Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 83 Fed. Reg. 35174 (July 25, 2018).
248 83 Fed. Reg. at 35194.
249 83 Fed. Reg. at 35195; 35197-98. See also Jessica Wentz, Proposed Amendments to Endangered Species Act Regulations
Could Curtail Protections for Species Imperiled by Climate Change, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2018/09/19/proposed-amendments-to-endangered-species-actregulations-could-curtail-protections-for-species-imperiled-by-climate-change/.
250 See Dan Spinelli, This Is Why Lawmakers Want to Gut the Endangered Species Act, MOTHER JONES (July 25, 2018);
Rebecca Bowe, What’s Behind Attacks on the Endangered Species Act? Lots of Money, EARTHJUSTICE BLOG (July 18, 2017).
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C. Expanding Land Available for Fossil Fuel Development
1. Expanding Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing
As noted above, Secretarial Order No. 3350 directed the Bureau of Ocean Energy
management (BOEM) to develop a new five-year plan for oil and gas exploration in offshore
waters and to reconsider a number of regulations governing those activities, pursuant to
President Trump’s Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy.
That order also purported to revoke two actions taken by the Obama administration to withdraw
approximately 125 million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) from leasing (including
most of the Beaufort Sea and all of the Chukchi Sea in the Arctic).251
On January 4, 2018, BOEM issued a proposed OCS Leasing Program for 2019-2024, which
would make over ninety percent of the OCS available for future oil and gas exploration and
development.252 In comparison, the 2017-2022 offshore leasing program (which would be
superseded by this new program) puts ninety-four percent of the OCS off-limits to oil and gas
development. The Draft Proposed Program (DPP) includes 47 potential lease sales in 25 of 26
planning areas – which, according to DOI, is the largest number of lease sales ever proposed for
the OCS 5-year lease schedule.253 DOI has not yet published a draft EIS or final rule for this
program.
In the meantime, the administration has continued to move forward with expanding
offshore oil and gas production under the existing OCS program. As of September 2018, the
administration had offered 81,324,267 acres of publicly owned waters to oil and gas companies.254
However, the administration was recently blocked from moving forward with its plans to open
up the Beaufort and Chukchi seas for oil and gas leasing. On March 29, 2019, a district court in
the District of Alaska found that President Trump’s order to re-open the areas of the OCS for oil

See Exec. Order 13795 (2018), supra note 18, at §§ 4(c), 5.
DOI Press Release: Secretary Zinke Announces Plan For Unleashing America's Offshore Oil and Gas Potential (Jan.
4, 2018), https://perma.cc/8RZB-GC37; BOEM, DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM: 2019-2024 NATIONAL OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING (Jan. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/Q683-6S5V; BOEM, Notice of Availability of the
2019-2024 Draft Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program and Notice of Intent To Prepare a
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 83 Fed. Reg. 829 (Jan. 8, 2018);
253 Id.
254 The Wilderness Society, Trump’s Land Grab – In 7 Maps (2018),
https://wilderness.maps.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html.
251
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and gas leasing that had been withdrawn by President Obama violated the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) because the act only authorizes Presidents to withdraw areas from the
national oil and gas leasing program (and thus the authority to add areas remains with
Congress).255 The following month, DOI Secretary David Bernhardt announced that the
department had indefinitely paused its plans to expand offshore oil and gas production in view
of the ruling.256

2. Removing Protections for National Monuments
The Trump administration has also sought to increase the land available for fossil fuel
development by removing protections that would bar such development, such as those provided
for national monuments designated under the Antiquities Act of 1906.
On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13792, Review of
Designations Under the Antiquities Act, which established a policy recognizing that national
monuments “have a substantial impact on the management of Federal lands and the use and
enjoyment of neighboring lands” and that such designations may “create barriers to achieving
energy independence, restrict public access to and use of Federal lands, burden State, tribal, and
local governments, and otherwise curtail economic growth.”257 The order directed DOI to conduct
a review of all National Monuments designated or expanded since 1996 where the designation or
expansion covers more than 100,000 acres or where DOI believes the designation or expansion
was made without adequate public outreach, to determine whether each designation or
expansion confirms with this policy.258
On May 11, 2017, DOI announced plans to conduct the review called for in the Executive
Order and to formulate recommendations for Presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other
appropriate actions to carry out that policy.259 The notice identified twenty-seven National

League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F.Supp.3d (D. Alaska 2019).
Timothy Puko, Trump’s Offshore Oil-Drilling Plan Sidelined Indefinitely, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 25, 2019).
257 Exec. Order. No. 13792 of April 26, 2017, Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 20429
(May 1, 2017).
258 Id. at § 2.
259 DOI, Review of Certain National Monuments Established Since 1996; Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment,
82 Fed. Reg. 22016 (May 11, 2017).
255
256
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Monuments under review and invites comments to inform the review.260 On August 24, 2017,
DOI released a summary of findings from its public outreach during this review process, in which
it recognized that the “[c]omments received were overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining
existing monuments.”261

On December 5, 2017, DOI released a final report in which it

recommended maintaining all national monuments as federal lands, adding three new national
monuments, but also modifying the boundaries and management of four monuments and
expanding access for hunting and fishing.262
Acting on these recommendations, President Trump issued proclamations reducing the
size of two national monuments in Utah: the Bears Ears National Monument was reduced from
1.35 million acres to just over 200,000 acres,263 and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument was reduced from 1.8 million acres to approximately 860,000 acres.264 These were the
most significant reductions of National Monuments by any president.265 Emails obtained from a
FOIA request showed that the availability of oil and coal on these lands was a key part of the
decision to reduce the size of the monuments.266
Multiple tribes and conservation organizations sued over the reduction of the
monuments, arguing that the Antiquities Act only authorizes a President to designate
monuments – it does not grant authority to revoke or modify a monument. The lawsuits have
been consolidated into two cases – one for Grand Staircase and one for Bears Ears – but briefing
schedules have not yet been set.267 In the meantime, DOI has already opened the land removed

Id.
DOI Press Release: Secretary Zinke Sends Monument Report to the White House (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7JP4-BM5B.
262 DOI Memorandum: Final Report Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act
(Dec. 5, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/HLE3-SCGK.
263 Presidential Proclamation 9681 of December 4, 2017: Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg.
58081 (Dec. 4, 2017).
264 Presidential Proclamation 9682 of December 4, 2017: Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 58089 (Dec. 8. 2017).
265 Juliet Eilperin, Trump to Cut Bears National Monument by 85 Percent, Grand Staircase-Escalante by Half, Documents
Show, Washington Post (Nov. 30, 2017).
266 Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central in Decision to Shrink Bears Ears Monument, Emails Show, N.Y. Times
(Mar. 2, 2018); Brian Maffly, Oil and Coal Drove Trump’s Call to Shrink Bears Ears and Grand Staircase, According to
Insider Emails Released by Court Order, The Salt Lake Tribune (Mar. 3, 2018).
267 Wilderness Society et al v. Trump et al, Docket No. 1:17-cv-02587 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017) (Grand Staircase Escalante
National Monument); Hopi Tribe et al. v. Trump et al, Docket No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec 04, 2017) (Bears Ears
National Monument).
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from the monuments for mining and fossil fuel development,268 and as of June 2018, more than
51,000 acres had been leased to oil companies269 and at least 20 mining claims totaling 460 acres
had been had staked on those lands.270

3. Expanding Fossil Fuel Leasing on Other Lands
DOI and its constituent agencies have also taken a number of steps to expand fossil fuel
leasing on other federal lands. As of September 2018, the administration had offered 13,667,241
acres of publicly owned land to oil and gas companies (more than the size of Maryland and New
Jersey combined).271 BLM also recently opened 9 million acres of sage grouse habitat to drilling
and mining through revisions to the RMPs covering that habitat.272 This is a particularly
controversial action because, as noted above, as the federal government relied upon protections
in the existing RMPs as the basis for determining that the sage grouse need not be listed under
the ESAAs noted above, a district court in Idaho recently issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting BLM from applying its policy on streamlining oil and gas permitting in the sage
grouse habitat. The administration is also moving forward with plans for oil and gas leasing in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) after Congress passed legislation in late 2017 which
opened the ANWR for drilling, and recently published a proposal to open anywhere from 66 to
100% of the 1.5 million-acre ANWR coastal plain for leasing.273

J. Weston Phippen, Bears Ears Officially Opens to Oil and Gas Development, Outside (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://perma.cc/M75F-GASD.
269 Miranda Green, Drillers Snag Leases Near Bears Ears Monument, The Hill (Mar. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/23E8ULML.
270 Chris D’Angelo, 20 Mining Claims Have Been Staked On Land Trump Cut From Monument Protection, Huffington Post
(June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C8S7-MPSM.
271 The Wilderness Society, Trump’s Land Grab – In 7 Maps (2018), supra note 254.
272 The revised RMPs are available at: DOI, Notice of Intent to Amend the Greater Sage-Grouse Resource Management Plan
Revisions and Amendment(s), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-frontoffice/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&currentPageId=134121 (last visited
May 16, 2019).
273 DOI, Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed RMP and EIS, https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-frontoffice/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=renderDefaultPlanOrProjectSite&projectId=102555&dctmId=0
b0003e8810d09e5 (last visited May 16, 2019. See also Steve Eder & Henry Fountain, The Race for Alaskan Oil: 6 Key
Takeaways, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018).
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V. Department of Energy
The Department of Energy (DOE) has also played a role in President Trump’s agenda for
promoting fossil fuels and rolling back climate-related protections. There are two key areas in
which DOE has assisted with these efforts: (i) by rolling back certain energy efficiency standards,
and (ii) by participating in Trump’s attempt to revive the coal industry.

A. Energy Efficiency Standards
When President Trump first took office, he issued a Presidential Memorandum,
“Regulatory Freeze Pending review,” which directed all agencies to postpone the publication of
new and pending regulations to give the administration time to review those regulations. Acting
pursuant to this memorandum, DOE postponed the publication of several energy efficiency
standards that it had recently finalized but not yet published in the Federal Register, including
standards for portable air conditions, uninterruptible power supplies, walk-in-cooler and freezer
systems, commercial packaged boilers, air compressors, and pool pumps.274 DOE also postponed
the effective date of five efficiency-related rules that had been published in the Federal Register
until March 21, 2017, including test procedures for walk-in coolers and freezers, test procedures
for central air conditioners and heaters, test procedures for compressors, energy conservation
standards for ceiling fans, and energy efficient construction standards for federal buildings.275 On

DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Portable Air Conditioners; Final Rule,
RIN 1904-AD02 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/2HBF-TKN6; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy
Conservation Standards for Walk-in Cooler and Freezer Refrigeration System; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD59 (Dec.
2016), https://perma.cc/U2YD-ZUVW; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for
Commercial Packaged Boilers; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD01 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/C57Y-VG5B; DOE, Energy
Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Dedicated-Purpose Pool Pumps; Final Rule, RIN 1904AD52 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/3WWP-UR36; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Uninterruptible Power Supplies; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD69 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/X4RM-3BE9;
DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Air
Compressors; Final rule, RIN 1904-AC83 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/LC4J-837Z.
275 DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedure for Walk-in Coolers and Walk-in Freezers; Final Rule; Delay
of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8805 (Jan. 31, 2017); DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation
Standards for Ceiling Fans; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8806 (Jan. 31, 2017); DOE, Energy
Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule; Delay of Effective
Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 2, 2017); DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Compressors; Final
Rule; Delay of Effective Date; 82 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 2, 2017); DOE, Energy Efficiency Standards for the Design and
274
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March 21, 2017, DOE further postponed the effective date for those five rules to new dates in June,
July and September 2017.276
On March 31, 2017, a coalition of states filed a petition challenging the administration’s
decision to delay the energy efficiency standards for ceiling fans.277 The plaintiffs included
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New York State, New York City, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Two
months later, DOE published notice that the ceiling fans rule would be finalized and would go
into effect on September 30, 2017, thus ending the dispute over the ceiling fans.278 DOE also issued
a notice that it would finalize standards and set compliance dates for residential central air
conditioners and heat pumps.279
On June 13, 2017, the same coalition of states and several NGOs filed suit over DOE’s
failure to finalize five other energy efficiency standards – specifically those for air compressors,
walk-in coolers and freezers, uninterruptable power supplies, portable air conditioners, and
commercial packaged boilers.280 On February 15, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California held that DOE’s failure to publish the efficiency standards violated its duties
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.281 The court therefore granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and ordered DOE to publish the standards.
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed a separate lawsuit challenging DOE’s
temporary suspension of efficiency test procedures for air conditioners and heat pumps. Plaintiffs

Construction of New Federal Low-Rise Residential Buildings' Baseline Standards Update; Final Rule; Delay of
Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 9343 (Feb. 6, 2017).
276 DOE, Test Procedure for Walk-in Coolers and Walk-in Freezers; Final Rule; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82
Fed. Reg. 14426 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Test Procedures for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule;
Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14425 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Test Procedures for Compressors; Final
Rule; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14426 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for
Ceiling Fans; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg.14427 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Energy Efficiency
Standards for the Design and Construction of New Federal Low-Rise Residential Buildings' Baseline Standards
Update; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14427 (Mar. 21, 2017).
277 New York et al. v. Perry, No. 17-918 (2d Cir. 2017)
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2017_03_31_petition_and_rules_final.pdf
278 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Ceiling Fans; Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 23723 (May 24, 2017).
279 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule; 82
Fed. Reg. 24211 (May 26, 2017).
280 NRDC v. Perry, No. 3:17-cv-03404 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
281 NRDC v. Perry, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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were successful with this challenge as well. On February 22, 2019, a district court in the Southern
District of New York held that the suspension violated the APA because it had been issued
without adherence to notice and comment procedures.282
DOE also withdrew a rule to establish energy conservation standards for manufactured
housing (which was called for by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007).283 The
proposed rule had been published in the Federal Register in June 2016,284 and DOE submitted the
final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review and publication
on November 1, 2016. But the final rule was not finalized as of January 21, 2017 (the date of the
regulatory freeze) and was therefore withdrawn in its entirety. The withdrawn rule would have
established requirements related to duct leakage; heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC);
service hot water systems; mechanical ventilation fan efficacy; and heating and cooling
equipment sizing, as well as requirements related to climate zones and the building thermal
envelope of manufactured homes. According to the DOE, the new energy efficiency standards
would have reduced total CO2 emissions by 60.5 and 97.6 million metric tons, from single-section
and multi-section homes, respectively, purchased between 2017-2046. The DOE also calculated
the net economic impact of the standards and concluded that they would generate $5.29-$8.93
billion in net consumer benefits and $11.52-$31.95 billion in net nationwide benefits over a 30year period. The nationwide benefits are much larger because they include the environmental
impacts of the anticipated CO2 and NOx reductions.
On February 11, 2019, DOE issued a proposal to repeal another energy efficiency rule –
specifically, regulations that expanded the number of light bulbs subject to energy efficiency
standards which go into effect next year.285 The regulations that DOE has proposed to repeal
redefined the term “general service lamps” to include certain light bulbs that were previously
considered to be so specialized that they should not be subject to standard rules, primarily bulbs

NRDC v. DOE, No. 1:17-cv-06989 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
DOE, Energy Efficiency Standards for Manufactured Housing, RIN 1904-AC11 (2016).
284 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Manufactured Housing; Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 39756 (June 17,
2016).
285 DOE, Proposed Rule: Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service Lamps,
84 Fed. Reg. 3120 (Feb. 11, 2019).
282
283
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known as incandescent reflector lamps. Commentators have noted that this rollback could cost
U.S. consumers billions of dollars in lost energy savings.286

B. Support for Coal Power Generation Facilities
In the summer of 2017, DOE conducted a grid vulnerability study to assess whether
changing energy market conditions were affecting grid reliability and resilience. DOE’s final
report on the topic contained many positive findings about “variable renewable energy” (VRE)
resources (primarily wind and solar) – specifically, that they actually made the electricity grid
more flexible and reliable, made bulk power less expensive, and performed a “price stabilizing
role.”287 But DOE also found that the dispatch of VRE “has negatively impacted the economics of
baseload plants” – specifically, coal and nuclear plants – and expressed concerns that this could
adversely affect grid reliability (despite the other findings in the report indicating that greater
penetration of VRE may improve reliability).288
Based on that concern, DOE proposed a Resiliency Pricing Rule on September 28, 2017,
which would have subsidized nuclear- and coal- fired generation in three wholesale power
markets where other sources of generation are more economically competitive.289 Specifically, the
proposal purported to direct FERC to use its authority under the Federal Power Act to require
wholesale electricity market operators to provide a special discounted rate for generators that
demonstrate “reliability and resiliency attributes” such as a 90-day fuel supply and the ability to
provide ancillary reliably services (essentially, attributes of baseload coal and nuclear facilities).290
FERC issued an order on January 8, 2018 rejecting the rule, finding that it did not satisfy the
requirements of the Federal Power Act – in particular, the requirement to make a showing that

Alliance to Save Energy, DOE Proposal to Roll Back Lightbulb Efficiency Would Hurt Consumers, Innovation (Feb. 6,
2019).
287 DOE, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RELIABILITY (Aug. 2017), available at
https://perma.cc/5Q4F-V6NU. These findings are embedded within the report in an apparent attempt to obscure the
benefits of renewable energy. For analyses of the report findings, see EDF, ANALYSIS OF DRAFT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY GRID STUDY (2017), available at in issu; David Roberts, Rick Perry and His Own Grid Study Are Saying Very
Different Things, Vox (Aug. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/9D7W-XTDL.
288 DOE Grid Reliability Study, supra note 287, at 13.
289 DOE, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule; ANPR, 82 Fed. Reg. 46940 (Oct. 10, 2017).
290 Id.
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existing rates are “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”291 In that same
order, FERC initiated its own proceeding to evaluate bulk power system resilience on a more
holistic basis, looking not only at the impacts of fuel supply but also market rules and
coordination, transmission planning, and reliability standards.292 This proceeding is still ongoing.
Despite this setback, the administration moved forward with its efforts to provide
preferential treatment to coal and nuclear facilities. On June 1, 2018, the White House announced
that President Trump had asked DOE to take immediate steps to prevent retirement of coal and
nuclear power generation facilities.293 On that same day, a draft memo dated May 29, 2018, was
leaked which outlined actions for DOE to take on this matter.294 According to that memo, DOE
planned to exercise its emergency authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the
Federal Power Act to direct grid operators to purchase power from a designated list of nuclear
and coal power plants. This system would remain in place for two years while the federal
government conducts research on vulnerabilities in U.S. energy delivery systems, including those
associated with the transition from fossil fuels to renewables. The memo confirmed earlier reports
that DOE was looking to use its emergency authority to support coal and nuclear operations.295
However, in June 2019, DOE Secretary Rick Perry announced that DOE does not have the
“regulatory or statutory ability” to create economic incentives for coal or nuclear plants and that
the administration would need to rely on FERC to move forward with its plans.296

C. Expediting and Curtailing Reviews for Natural Gas Infrastructure Approvals
DOE and FERC have also undertaken efforts to streamline and expediate approvals of
natural gas transportation infrastructure, including pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG)
terminals. On September 1, 2017, DOE proposed a rule to provide for automated approval of

FERC Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing Additional
Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018).
292 Id.
293 Avery Anapol, Trump Considering Emergency Authority to Boost Coal Plants, The Hill (June 1, 2018).
294 DOE Addendum, Draft (5/29/18), available at https://perma.cc/2XLL-3DT2.
295 Emma Foehringer Merchant, The Trump Administration Just Hatched Another Plan to Buoy Coal and Nuclear, GREEN
TECH MEDIA (Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/9VHM-EZY4.
291

Catherine Morehouse, DOE Has No ‘Regulatory or Statutory Ability’ to Create Coal, Nuclear Bailout, Says
Perry, UTILITY DIVE (June 12, 2019). See also Eric Wolff & Darius Dixon, Rick Perry’s Coal Rescue Runs
Aground at White House, POLITICO (Oct. 15, 2018).
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applications for small-scale exports of natural gas (of a volume up to and including 0.14 billion
cubic feet (Bcf) per day) to countries with which the U.S. has not entered into a free trade
agreement and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy.297 DOE published a final
rule for that proposal on July 25, 2018.298
Some have argued that expanding natural gas infrastructure may actually reduce
greenhouse gas emissions because natural gas will replace coal as an energy source. However,
expanding this infrastructure also locks in the use of natural gas as opposed to cleaner energy
sources, and recent studies have found that natural gas infrastructure emits significantly more
methane than previously estimated (which raises questions about the actual magnitude of the
emission reduction benefits associated with switching from coal to natural gas).299 DOE and FERC
have also received criticism for failing to analyze the effect of expanding natural gas
transportation infrastructure on fossil fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate
change. FERC, in particular, has resisted public requests to fully evaluate upstream and
downstream emissions generated as a result of its pipeline approvals. In 2017, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an analysis of downstream emissions was required for a pipeline
project where FERC knew that the natural gas would be transported to and consumed at domestic
power plants.300 However, since that decision, FERC has declined to analyze downstream
emissions for other natural gas transportation projects on the basis that it “does not have
meaningful information about future power plants, storage facilities, or distribution networks”
that it can use to forecast those emissions.301

VI. State Department
The State Department has been responsible for implementing Trump’s agenda with
respect to foreign policy on climate change. The Department has taken measures to reduce U.S.

DOE, Proposed Rule; Small-Scale Natural Gas Exports, 82 Fed. Reg. 41570 (Sept. 1, 2017).
DOE, Final Rule: Small-Scale Natural Gas Exports, 83 Fed. Reg. 35106 (July 25, 2018).
299 See, e.g., Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane Emissions from U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCIENCE
186 (2018).
300 Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
301 FERC Order Denying Rehearing, 163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (May 18, 2018).
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participation in international discussions occurring under the UNFCCC – for example, by
reducing the number of staff in its Office of Global Change and by eliminating the special envoy
for climate change.302 Its most significant role of course has been in carrying out President
Trump’s plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

A. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on June
1, 2017.303 In that announcement, he stated that the U.S. would “cease all implementation of the
Paris Agreement” including the implementation of our Nationally Determined Contribution
(NDC) and contributions to the Green Climate Fund.304 On August 4, 2017, the State Department
submitted a formal communication to the UNFCCC Secretariat expressing its intent to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement “as soon as it is eligible to do so.”305
Notably, the Paris Agreement does not allow parties to submit their notice of withdrawal
until three years after its entry into force (November 4, 2016). Once a party does submit such
notice, there is a one-year period before the withdrawal becomes effective. Thus, the U.S.
withdrawal cannot become effective until November 4, 2020 (the day after the next presidential
election). The agreement does not explicitly address the procedures for rejoining the agreement
after exiting, but a future President could re-join the agreement, as there is no bar on re-entry.
President Trump and the State Department have not made any formal effort to withdraw
from the UNFCCC parent agreement. That agreement was ratified by the Senate in 1992 and the
U.S. is still bound to adhere to the commitments contained therein. There is an unsettled legal
debate as to whether a President can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty that was ratified by the

Karl Mathiesen, US State Department to Abolish Climate Change Envoy, Climate Home News (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://perma.cc/PL6J-WDSE.
303 Exec. Office of the White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/MR53-SGN8.
304 Under the agreement, the U.S. had previously submitted a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in which
we committed to reducing the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025.
305 Karl Mathiesen, Trump Letter to UN on Leaving Paris Climate Accord – In Full, Climate Home News (July 8, 2017),
https://perma.cc/EAT8-QL2Q. See also U.S. Dept. of State, Media Note: Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw from
Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017); Susan Biniaz, The U.S. Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw from the Paris
Agreement: What Does It Mean? Climate Law Blog (Aug. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/V88P-UX38.
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Senate, but many scholars believe that the consent of the Senate is legally required in this
context.306

B. Approval of Transboundary Pipelines
The State Department has the authority to issue Presidential Permits for transboundary
oil pipelines and other infrastructure intended to export or import oil.307 The State Department
must determine that such infrastructure is in the public interest before issuing a permit, taking
into account factors such as safety, environment, and economic impacts. During the Obama
Administration, the State Department reviewed and ultimately denied the application for the
Keystone XL pipeline based on a determination that it would not serve the public interest.308 The
“critical factor” cited in this decision was the department’s determination that “moving forward
with this project would significantly undermine our ability to continue leading the world in
combatting climate change.”309
President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum on January 24, 2017, in which he
invited the pipeline developer, TransCanada, to re-submit its application and directed the
Secretary of State to “take all actions necessary and appropriate” to expedite the approval of this
application.310 The State Department approved the Keystone XL pipeline application on March
23, 2017.311 Environmental and tribal groups challenged the approval in court, alleging violations
of the APA, NEPA, Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act. On November 8, 2018, the Montana District Court issued a decision in favor
of petitioners and enjoined TransCanada from engaging in any activity in furtherance of the
construction and operation of the pipeline.312 The court held that the State Department had
violated the APA by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for reversing course on the pipeline

For a discussion of this unresolved legal issue, see Stephen P. Mulligan, Withdrawal from International Agreements:
Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, CRS Research Paper No. R44761 (Feb. 9, 2017).
307 See Exec. Order. No. 13337, 3 C.F.R. § 1(g) (2004).
308 Department of State, Notice of a Decision to Deny a Presidential Permit to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LP fo
the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline, 80 Fed. Reg. 76611 (Dec. 9, 2015).
309 Press Statement from Secretary of State John Kerry: Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Determination (Nov. 6, 2015).
310 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017).
311 Department of State, Notice of Issuance of a Presidential Permit to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., 82 Fed.
Reg. 16467 (Apr. 4, 2017).
312 Indigenous Environmental Network v. United States Department of State, No. 4:17-cv-00029 (D. Mont., Nov. 8,
2018).
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application, and that the State Department had also erred in its NEPA analysis by failing to
analyze the cumulative effects of this and another connected pipeline project on climate change.

VII. Conclusion
Upon coming into office, the Trump administration promised to roll back many of the
regulatory measures the Obama administration had put in place to protect the climate and to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As detailed above, however, most of the deregulatory actions
undertaken by the Trump administration with respect to climate change and fossil fuels are
incomplete or stalled in the courts. The administration has been able to quickly repeal and revise
policy statements and guidance documents, but modifying regulations has proven to be a much
lengthier and more challenging process. To date, only four of the notice-and-comment
rulemakings identified in this paper have resulted in final agency action (amendments to the
Methane Waste Prevention Rule, amendments to the Coal Ash Rule, minor amendments to the
Methane NSPS for Oil and Gas Sources, and repeal of the Coal, Oil, and Gas Valuation Rule). All
of the other rulemakings are either still in the preliminary stages of review or at the proposed rule
stage. It could be months or years before the administration promulgates a final action in those
proceedings, and if and when that occurs, the actions will most likely be challenged in court.
There are also the prospects that courts may vacate final rules issued by the Trump
administration to repeal and revise climate change protections or that the next President will
reverse course and reinstate or even strengthen those protections. All of this regulatory back-andforth consumes a tremendous amount of administrative resources and creates significant
uncertainty for regulated entities. For all these reasons, Trump’s deregulatory efforts are not
likely to achieve their results.
Ultimately, this situation is untenable for both regulated entities and an American public
that wants effective action to reduce the risk of global climate change. There is a compelling need
for a coherent and cohesive federal policy on climate change that will protect the public’s welfare
while also providing the clarity and predictability that regulated entities require. President
Trump’s deregulatory agenda undermines both of these goals and should itself be replaced.
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